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MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET:
SAME PROBLEMS - NO SOLUTIONS
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, the municipal securities market' was unregulated
and virtually unknown. Although the dollar volume of municipal bonds
issued each year was more. than substantial, the workings of the market
attracted little attention other than from underwriters and legal counsel
who specialized in municipal bond finance. A standard municipal bond
issue was a public offering of general obligation bonds, sold by a
syndicate of underwriters who had been chosen by competitive bidding.
Disclosure was not required and nonexistent. Those who purchased
municipal securities were well defined and included .commercial banks,
property and fire casualty insurance companies, and wealthy individuals.
These groups were able to take advantage of the federal income tax
exemption of interest paid on municipal bonds.
Then came the near default of New York in 1975 on $600 million
of debt, followed by the default of the Washington Public Power Supply
System (WPPSS) on $2.5 billion of outstanding bonds in 1988.2
Furthermore, for the first six months of 1995, the market was anticipating
the default of bankrupt Orange County, California on $800 million of
short-term debt due in the summer of 1995. Orange County managed to
renegotiate a one-year extension of the debt and avoided payment
default In recent months, stories of widespread corruption in the
municipal securities market have made headlines in major newspapers,
prompting a number of investigations and criminal indictments. The
front page of The Bond Buyer, a daily trade newspaper, often reads like
a local crime beat column.4
'The term "municipal securities" refers to the debt obligations of states and their
political subdivisions (e.g., municipalities, counties, towns, special districts, and school
districts).
2See generally SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE COMMISSION ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., STAFF REPORT ON
TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter
NEW YORK SEC REPORT] and DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION IN THE MATTER OF TRANSACTIONS IN
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM SECURITIES (Sept. 1988) [hereinafter WPPSS
SEC REPORT] for discussions of the events and circumstances of these two fiscal crises.
3See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
4See, e.g., Joyce Hanson, New Jersey Executives Face SEC, Justice Charges on
Kickback Ploy, THE BOND BUYER, Feb. 24, 1995, at 1; Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Steps Up
Municipal Bond Investigations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at D1; Lynn Stevens Hume, SEC
Official Says Bond Enforcement Major Priority for Municipal Market, THE BOND BUYER,
Jan. 26, 1995, at 1; Leslie Wayne, There's a New Sheriff in Town, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995,
at DI; Donald Yacoe, Escambia County, Florida, Defendants Plead Guilty in Pay to Play
Case, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 6, 1995, at 6.
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Today the municipal securities industry barely resembles the pre-
New York City crisis market. The types of securities issued and the
nature of investors and other participants have changed and expanded in
number. Municipal securities mutual funds and municipal bond
insurance, each a major factor in today's market, were virtually non-
existent before 1974. Finally, the regulatory environment has changed
significantly, so much so, that the current Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Arthur Levitt, has made the oversight of
the municipal securities market the primary focus of his tenure at the
SEC.
Since Chairman Levitt's appointment, the SEC has, both directly
and indirectly, advocated for major regulation of the municipal securities
market. It has also focused its enforcement energies on cleaning up the
market.' It has conducted a record number of investigations against
municipal securities dealers.7 Within days of the news of Orange
County's debacle in December 1994, the SEC began an investigation to
see if there were any violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. In March 1995, the SEC created, for the first time, a
division specifically devoted to issues of municipal finance, the Office of
Municipal Finance.
While much of Congress is moving to deregulate and "devolve"
power to the states, the SEC is moving in the opposite direction,
involving itself in matters which arguably are more properly the domain
of state and local governments. In the areas of corruption of
governmental officials and campaign reform, states appear willing to let
the federal government lead, perhaps in recognition that it is not
realistically possible for the states to regulate themselves.
This article examines the existing regulations of the municipal
securities market, focusing on what activities prompted the regulatory
5Wayne, supra note 4, at DI. Levitt declared, "Municipal finance is the No. I priority
of the commission." Id at DI.
6There have been reports of SEC investigations in connection with securities
transactions involving Denver, the District of Columbia, and Maricopa County, Arizona, among
others. Brad Altman, SEC Wants to See if County in Arizona Glossed Over Woes Before Three
Issues, THE BOND BUYER, Feb. 14, 1995, at 20; Lynn Stevens Hume, District of Columbia
Disclosure Issues Recall WPPSS, Taylor Sas, THE BOND BUYER, Feb. 10, 1995, at 5; see also
Wayne, supra note 4, at DI (discussing a $24 million SEC settlement with Merrill Lynch and
Lazard Freres and a $1.4 million settlement with Stifell Nicolaus, a regional broker).
7The term "municipal securities dealers" is used in this article to refer to brokers and
dealers of municipal securities, whether exclusively or as a part of a securities business, and
banks who underwrite and trade in municipal securities. Banks are authorized under the Glass-
Steagal Act to buy and sell general obligation bonds and certain types of revenue bonds. 12
U.S.C. § 24, para. Seventh (1994).
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changes and analyzing the direction and efficacy of these regulations in
terms of the deficiencies in the market. Part One gives a background
sketch of the market and its participants from the time of the New York
City fiscal crisis to today. Part Two discusses whether the existing
regulation is sufficient to produce disclosure, focusing on the Orange
County crisis. Part Three offers a critique of the current regulatory
scheme and makes some suggestions for reform.
Clearly, the enactment of regulations governing underwriting and
trading practices in the municipal securities market has had very positive
effects in bringing about more disclosure of information and more
uniformity in the standards for disclosure. However, disclosure remains
legally voluntary on the part of issuers. The existing SEC scheme of
regulation rests shakily on the SEC's authority to regulate under the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934
Act)8 rather than on a separate legislative structure, as in the case of the
corporate securities market.
The market continues to suffer from the lack of timely disclosure
of information. Observers of the market note that, despite the changes
in the legal climate with respect to disclosure, the rating agencies still
constitute the dominant force in the decision-making process for both the
investor and issuer.
At a more technical level, with the increased role of the SEC, one
must question the need for the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
as presently structured. As it is, the decision in 1975 to preserve the
balance of power between the federal, state and local governments, by not
regulating disclosure by municipal issuers, directly resulted in a more
cumbersome regulatory structure. Similarly, the reactions to other
deficiencies, such as corruption in the selection of underwriters and
poorly run municipal investment policies, tend to be solutions which add
more layers of participants, arguably increasing the possible points of
corruption in any particular securities offering.
PART ONE - REGULATORY SKETCH THROUGH TIME
A. Reactions to New York City Fiscal Crisis
The New York City fiscal crisis was a wake-up call to both the
securities market and Congress that the staid municipal securities market
had changed. The old rule of no rules had to be reexamined. For the
'15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
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first time, questions were raised about the serious inadequacies in market
information, particularly in light of the growth in the types of municipal
issuers, the types of securities being sold, and the number and types of
investors.9 New York City's close call with default raised the basic
question of how an issuer, the magnitude of New York City, could get
to the brink of bankruptcy without the market's knowledge?
In reaction, Congress took its first tentative step to regulate the
municipal securities market. It rejected legislative efforts to simply
eliminate the section 3(a) exemption for municipal issuers from the
91n the past twenty years, the municipal securities market has seen an expansion ofthe
market accompanied by a shift from general obligation bonds to revenue bonds, the
development ofthe bond insurance industry for less credit-worthy municipal bonds and perhaps
most significantly, the wider ownership of municipal bonds by individual investors in the
middle income brackets. Total municipal obligation debt outstanding in 1994 was S,209.9
trillion, as compared with $341.5 billion in 1979. Individual investors held S409 billion of
municipal debt in 1994; in 1979, they held $74.3 billion. In 1994, mutual funds held $220.6
billion of municipal securities; in 1974, the amount was $I billion; S61.3 billion of bonds were
insured in 1994, as compared to $63 million in 1974. See generally Ann Judith Gellis,
Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A Reevaluation, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 15, 25-40
(1987) (discussing shifts in the municipal securities market which had already occurred in the
1980s). These trends have continued, particularly in terms of the types of securities issued.
See also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF MmRUZ' REGULATION, SEC
STAFF REPORT ONTHE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 1-5 (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 SEC
STAFF REPORT] (stating that the municipal securities market comprises approximately 50,000
state and local issuers with an outstanding principal amount in excess of $1.2 trillion). The
1993 SEC Staff Report provides:
The types of securities municipalities generally issue include general
obligation bonds, revenue bonds, and conduit bonds. General obligation bonds
are secured by the fill faith and credit and general taxing power of the issuer.
A holder of general obligation bond may look for repayment to all sources of
revenue that the municipality is entitled to receive. Revenue bonds, on the
other hand, are typically issued to support a particular project, and are paid for
out of revenues from that project. "Conduit bonds, such as industrial
development bonds, are securities issued to finance a project that is to be used
in the trade or business of a private corporation. Typically, investors must
look solely to the credit of the private entity for payment of interest and
principal.
During the past few years, the municipal bond market has experienced
a proliferation of complex derivative products. Among these are principal and
interest strips, pooled municipal investment vehicles, detachable call options,
and new variable rate securities. These new forms of municipal securities are
designed to reduce issuers' costs while creating securities that meet perceived
investment needs of particular types of municipal investors. The complexity
of new products appears to be limited only by the ingenuity of investment
bankers and inherent limitations on issuers as a result of state and federal
laws, including federal tax laws.
Id at 1.
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registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 0 which
would have resulted in municipal and corporate securities issuers being
treated the same in terms of public primary offerings of securities. As a
compromise, Congress created a regulatory body, the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board (MSRB or Board),1' to establish fair practices for
underwriting and trading of municipal securities. Congress also required
brokers and dealers of municipal securities to register with the SEC. 2
But, through the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Congress
specifically prohibited the imposition of any pre-issuance filing
requirements, by either the SEC or the newly-created MSRB, on
municipal issuers in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of
securities. 3 Congress also prevented the MSRB from getting around this
prohibition by forbidding any requirement that brokers and dealers
furnish documents related to an issuer unless such information is
generally available from other sources. 4 These amendments to section
15B of the 1934 Act are known collectively as the Tower Amendment.
'015 U.S.C. § 77a (1994). At the time of the New York City crisis, two bills were
introduced in Congress, each of which would have required mandatory disclosure. S.2574,
94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 33,907 (1975); S.2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REc. 3321 (1976); see Ann Judith Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal
Securities: Issues in Implementation, 13 J. CoRp.L. 65, 75-77 (1987) for a discussion of these
bills.
"15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (1994).
'"Id. § 78o-4(a)(I)-(2).
3Section 78o-4(d)(1) provides:
Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this
chapter, by rule or regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities,
directly or indirectly through a purchaser orprospective purchaser of securities
from the issuer, to file with the Commission or the Board prior to the sale of
such securities by the issuer any application, report, or document in connection
with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such securities.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (1994).
4Section 78o-4(d)(2) provides:
(2) The Board is not authorized under this chapter to require any
issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through a municipal
securities broker or municipal securities dealer or otherwise, to furnish to the
Board or to a purchaser or a prospective purchaser of such securities any
application, report, document, or information with respect to such issuer:
Provided, however, That the Board may require municipal securities brokers
and municipal securities dealers to furnish to the Board or purchasers or
prospectivepurchasersofmunicipal securities applications,reports, documents,
and information with respect to the issuer thereof which is generally available
from a source other than such issuer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed to impair or limit the power of the Commission under any provision
of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(2) (1994).
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The Tower Amendment forms the structural foundation of the
current municipal securities regulatory scheme in that directives as to
market practices and procedures, including any requirements for
disclosure, are imposed on municipal securities dealers alone. As a
result, regulations as to information disclosure are primarily procedural.
The SEC has shied away from any content regulation because of the
prohibitions of the Tower Amendment. Any affirmative obligation on the
part of municipal issuers to provide information to investors is imposed
indirectly through application of the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws to municipal issuers, and interpretation of those provisions by the
SEC as they relate to the offering of municipal securities to the public."
The inability to regulate the market behavior of municipal issuers,
except indirectly, has resulted in a skewed regulatory scheme where the
interests of issuers are underrepresented, and the public's interest in
getting accurate and timely information is still dependent on voluntary
compliance by the issuers. It is perhaps too early to know, but the
startling bankruptcy of Orange County may suggest that this reliance is
ill-founded.
B. 1975 - 1989 Period
1. Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
There were two significant changes in the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975 concerning municipal securities. Section 3(a)(9) of
the 1934 Act 16 was added to clarify that municipal issuers could be sued
under section 10(b), and section 15B was added to create the MSRB."'
The MSRB is a hybrid organization, a combination of a
government regulatory body - a mini-SEC for municipal securities -
and a self-regulatory body, comparable to the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) for
"SMunicipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 54 Fed. Reg.
28,799 (July 10, 1989); Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33,742,
59 Fed. Reg. 12,759 (Mar. 17, 1994); Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release
No. 34,961, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,950
(Nov. 10, 1994). Thesereleases, accompanyingthe adoption of Rule 15c2-12 and theproposed
amendments of Rule 15c2-12 in 1994, set forth the SEC's views with respect to the disclosure
obligations of participants in the municipal securities market under the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws. In general, the SEC relies on the authority under § 10(b) and
§ 15(c)(1) and (2) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b), 78(c)(1)-(2) (1994).
1615 U.S.C. § 78e (1994).
'715 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (1994).
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corporate securities. The Board, located in Washington, D.C., is by
statute dominated by dealers and banks, who, as the underwriters and
traders of municipal securities offerings, are the subjects of the Board's
regulations. The Board has five members from investment banking firms,
five members from commercial banks, and five representatives of the
public which includes a minimum of one representative of issuers and
one representative of investors. 8
Much of the regulatory efforts of the MSRB has focused on
standardizing municipal securities trading practices. For example, Rule
G-8 (books and records); Rule G-15 (confirmation, clearance, and
settlement); G-17 (conduct of municipal securities business); and G-30
(prices and commissions), 9 to name a few. In this respect, given the type
of regulation and the makeup of the Board, the MSRB resembles the
other self-regulatory organizations (SROs). But, its powers are defined
by statute and its rules have the force of law. All rules, however, require
the approval of the SEC, as is true of the other SROs.2° Enforcement of
the MSRB rules is left to the SEC, the NASD, and with respect to bank
municipal securities dealers, the bank regulatory agencies: Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.'
A number of the rules of the MSRB are aimed at promoting
disclosure and better distribution of information to the market. For
example, Rule G-32 requires dealers to provide to their customers copies
1 8d.
"9MUNICIPAL SECURmEs RULEMAKING BOARD MANUAL (CCH) 3536 (Rule 0-8),
3571 (Rule G-15), 3581 (Rule G-17), 3646 (Rule G-30) (1995) [hereinafter MSRB MANUAL].
2 In the Senate Committee Report for the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, it is
clear that the SEC has oversight responsibility in the same way it has oversight responsibilities
for the other self-regulatory organizations under § 19(c) of the 1934 Act. In 1975, the U.S.
Senate commented:
Regular and systematic Commission review of proposed self-
regulatory rules alone is not sufficient to enable the Commission to discharge
its ultimate responsibility to ensure that Board rules are in conformity with the
public interest and applicable statutory standards. In addition, the Commission
must be in a position to review existing Board rules and policies to consider
their adequacy in light of new knowledge and experience and changed
regulatory circumstances. By continuously examining market circumstances
and regulatory needs, appraising and reappraising the adequacy of existing
regulatory measures, the Commission can exercise its supervisory powers to
ensure the continuing validity of self-regulation and the effectuation of the
purposes of the bill.
S. COMM. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (1975).
2115 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(2), (5) (1994).
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of official statements, voluntarily supplied by an issuer.' Rule G-36
requires that copies of final official statements be filed with the MSRB.
Rule G-19, the "suitability rule," requires dealers to have "reasonable
grounds" for believing that the recommendation of a sale to a customer
is suitable for that customer, and such belief is to be founded on
reasonable investigation. -4
Most recently, with the adoption of Rule G-37,' the MSRB has
also focused its attention on "leveling the playing field." Through
regulation of "pay-to-play" practices, the MSRB is seeking to root out
corruption and "questionable activities" in the municipal securities
market.2
6
The above descriptions are certainly not exhaustive of the MSRB's
activities and influence. The purpose here is to emphasize that for the
fourteen year period, from 1975 until the adoption of Rule 15c2-12 by
the SEC in 1989, the MSRB was the primary, and, in terms of disclosure
and distribution of information, the only regulator of the municipal
securities market.27 Furthermore, during this period, municipal securities
market participants came to recognize that the days of nondisclosure were
over. Investors would require better information from issuers - Tower
Amendment or no Tower Amendment.
22MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3656 (Rule G-32).
'Id. 3676 (Rule G-36).
24Id. 3591 (Rule G-19). In the last year, this rule has taken on added importance
because of the losses experienced by local governments on their investments in derivatives
securities.
'5Id. 3681 (Rule G-37).
26See infra part I.D.2 for a discussion of MSRB activity with respect to eliminating
"pay-to-play" practices in the municipal securities market.
2 Traditionally, there has been little regulation ofthe municipal securities market at the
state level. Generally, the issuance of securities by a local government is subject to a state
securities antifraud provision which resembles Exchange Act Rule lOb-5. In a case arising out
of the WPPSS default, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the test under the
Washington statute was one of negligence, not scienter. In response, the legislature changed
the test to scienter, except regarding bond counsel and underwriters. See 2 M. DAVID
GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING §§ 8:50, 8:51 (1995).
Distinct from state securities regulation is state regulation of the financial health ofthe
state's political subdivisions. The extent of regulation is different in each state. By the 1970s,
a number of states required the filing of annual reports, but nothing more. A very few required
state approval of bond offerings. Today, states are more active in monitoring the financial
well-being of their local governments. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
1996]
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2. Voluntary Disclosure
In 1979, Congress considered the deficiencies of the municipal
securities market evident in the mid-seventies. The Government Finance
Officers Association (GFOA) issued "Disclosure Guidelines for State and
Local Government Securities."28 Revised in 1988, and again in 1991,
these guidelines have been the mainstay of municipal securities disclosure
standards. Other groups have since issued recommended disclosures for
their constituents, but the GFOA Guidelines remain the foremost set of
voluntary disclosure standards.29 The organization itself is the primary
voice for municipal securities issuers in the regulation and operation of
the market and, as such, is an important player in determining regulation
of the market.
There are two sets of guidelines, one for preparation of official
statements, the other for preparation of continuing disclosure, the latter
issued in 1979 and subsequently revised in 1991. The guidelines for
offerings are organized to provide an issuer with a structure for
presenting information, beginning with the cover page of the official
statement and a description of what kinds of information should be
included in each section of the official statement?0
C. WPPSS Default; Adoption of Rule 15c2-12
The WPPSS default in 1988, however, made it apparent that the
MSRB rules and market forces alone were not sufficient to correct the
informational problems of the municipal bond market. There had been
28GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES (4th ed. 1991). See Statement of the Commission
Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Exchange Act
Release No. 33,741, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,748 (Mar. 17, 1994) (discussing the role of the guidelines
and noting that the guidelines have widespread acceptance). The 1993 SEC Staff Report points
out, however, that the guidelines, which serve as the industry standards, call for less disclosure
than the SEC requires for registered corporate offerings. 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note
9, at 24.
29For example, the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, Disclosure Handbook
for Municipal Securities - 1992 Update; Healthcare Financial Management Association,
Principles and Practices Board Statement 18 - Public Disclosure of Financial and Operating
Information by Healthcare Providers. See 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 55
(listing other industry guidelines, e.g., Public Securities Association Recommendations;
Guidelines for State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers; and Guidelines for Housing
Agencies).
"Information may include a description of the security, presentation of financial
information and information needed in conduit offerings..
(Vol. 21
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major improvements in disclosure of information, including more
uniformity, with much credit going to' the efforts of the GFOA.
However, the behavior of issuers, underwriters and counsel, as evidenced
by the WPPSS official statements, continued to fall short in terms of
adequate disclosure.3
In 1989, after an investigation of the WPPSS securities
transactions, the SEC stepped in to directly regulate the primary offerings
of municipal securities with the adoption of Rule 15c2-12.?2 Rule 15c2-
12 was issued pursuant to the authority given to the SEC under the
antifraud provisions of sections 10 and 15 of the 1934 Act. As discussed
above, the prohibitions contained in the Tower Amendment do not permit
direct disclosure regulation of issuers, at least in terms of imposing any
pre-filing requirement. Thus, Rule 15e2-12 indirectly regulates issuers
by regulating the activities of underwriters of municipal securities."
Rule 15c2-12 basically requires underwriters (1) to obtain and
review a "deemed final official statement of the issuer" prior to bidding
for, offering, or selling municipal securities in a primary offering; and (2)
to distribute copies of the official statement to potential purchasers, who
so request, within ninety days of the end of the underwriting period.34
"See Gellis, supra note 9, at 69-70.
3217 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (1995). Accompanying the proposed rule was a lengthy
interpretive release on the investigative obligations of underwriters. Municipal Securities
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,100, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778 (Sept. 28,1988). The final
rule was issued, with a few slight modifications from the proposed rule, in 1989. Municipal
Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (July 10, 1989).
The thrust of the interpretive release was that underwriters must conduct a review of the issuer
and the offering sufficient to allow the underwriter to represent that it has a "reasonable basis
for belief in the accuracy and completeness of the key representations in the documents." Id.
at 28,811.
"See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
"The Rule specifies that an underwriter
(1) Prior to the time the Participating Underwriter bids for, purchases,
offers, or sells municipal securities in an Offering, the Participating
Underwriter shall obtain and reviewan official statement that an issuer ofsuch
securities deems final as of its date, except for the omission of no more than
the following information: The offering price(s), interest rate(s), selling
compensation, aggregate principal amount, principal amount per maturity,
delivery dates, any other terms or provisions required by an issuer of such
securities to be specified in a competitive bid, ratings, other terms of the
securities depending on such matters, and the identity of the underwriter(s).
(2) Except in competitively bid offerings, from the time the Participating
Underwriter has reached an understanding with an issuer of municipal
securities that it will become a Participating Underwriter in an Offering until
a final official statement is available, the Participating Underwriter shall send
no later than the next business day, by first-class mail or other equally prompt
19961
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The Rule also introduces the concept of Nationally Recognized
Municipal Securities Information Repositories (NRMSIRs), as a key to
the distribution of information in the marketplace." Unlike the scheme
for corporate securities regulation, there are no requirements to file any
documents with the SEC either for review or, simply, as an informational
filing. 6 Rather, the Rule contemplates filing with private entities set up
to provide the public with access to information about municipal issuers
and their securities. 7 To encourage the use of NRMSIRs, the filing of
a copy of the final official statement with a NRMSIR shortens the period
in which an underwriter is obligated to distribute copies of the official
statement to purchasers from ninety to twenty-five days from the end of
means, to any potential customer, on request, a single copy of the most recent
preliminary official statement, if any.
(3) The Participating Underwriter shall contract with an issuer of
municipal securities or its designated agent to receive, within seven business
days after any final agreement to purchase, offer, or sell the municipal
securities in an Offering and in sufficient time to accompany any confirmation
that requests payment from any customer, copies of a final official statement
in sufficient quantity to comply with paragraph (b)(4) of this rule and the rules
of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
(4) From the time the final official statement becomes available until the
earlier of (i) Ninety days from the end of the underwriting period or (ii) The
time when the official statement is available to any person from a nationally
recognized municipal securities information repository, but in no case less than
twenty-five days following the end of the underwriting period, the
Participating Underwriter in an Offering shall send no later than the next
business day, by first-class mail or other equally prompt means, to any
potential customer, on request, a single copy of the final official statement.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2(b)(l)-(4) (1995).
The term "deemed final" is defined to mean the completed document delivered to the
underwriters by the issuer containing all material information about the issuer and the issue,
except that price information, interest rates, underwriters compensation, etc., may be left out.
See GELFAND, supra note 27, § 8:10 (discussing the rule and its application).
3S17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(4) (1995). The term NRMSIRis not defined in the Rule.
See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799,
28,808 n.65 (July 10, 1989), which sets forth the factors the SEC would use to determine
whether a repository would be recognized as a NRMSIR. See also Municipal Securities
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33,742, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,759, 12,764-12,7665 (Mar. 17,
1994) (discussing the concept of NRMSIRs). In the adopting release for the amendments to
Rule 15c2-12, the SEC decided that the factors originally set forth would not be altered and
the SEC practice of reviewing proposals for NRMSIRs and issuing no action letters for firms
meeting the standards would be left in place. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act
Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at
85,970-85,971 (Nov. 10, 1994).
36Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,970-85,971 (Nov. 10, 1994).
37Id.
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the underwriting period." The end of the underwriting period is defined
as the later of such time as "(i) the issuer of municipal securities delivers
the securities to the Participating Underwriters or (ii) the Participating
Underwriter does not retain, directly or as a member of an underwriting
syndicate, an unsold balance of the securities for sale to the public. 39
At the time of the Rule's adoption, there were no NRMSIRs in
existence. The MSRB had proposed to set up a central filing system
under its aegis. The SEC, however, rejected the Board's centralized
filing proposal in favor of the competitive private sector system of
NRMSIRs. 40
To be approved as a NRMSIR, the entity must demonstrate that it
is national in scope, maintains current and accurate information, has an
effective retrieval and dissemination system, is open to any issuer, and
allows public access to the information at reasonable cost.4 It is the
practice for entities seeking to be a NRMSIR to file their proposals with
the SEC. If approved, the SEC issues a "no action" letter to the entity.42
At present, there are six SEC-approved NRMSIRs for documents
filed under Rule 15c2-12.43 With the 1994 amendment, Rule 15c2-12,
which requires the filing of periodic disclosure documents with
NRMSIR," the number of other companies planning to apply for
recognition as NRMSIRs is expected to grow. And, in fact, three of the
six NRMSIRs are post Rule 15c2-12 amendment additions.45
Rule 15c2-12 does not apply to primary offerings of an aggregate
principal amount of less than $1 million.46 Also, exemptions from the
317 C.F.R. § 240.15c2(b)(4) (1995).
3917 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(0(2)(i)-(ii) (1995).
'TheMSRB operates a central file, called the Municipal Securities Information Library
(MSIL), in which primary and secondary market disclosure documents are filed. Pursuant to
MSRB Rule G-36, two copies of official statements are required to be given to the MSRB,one
of which is filed in the MSIL. The MSIL is not, however, a NRMSIR. There was
considerable debate among market participants over the issue of a central versus many
repositories. For discussions of this issue and, more broadly, the role of the MSRB as a
repository, see Symposium, The Future Role and Governance of the AISRB, 12 Mmi. FIt. J.
48 (1991).
41See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985,54 Fed. Reg.
28,799, 28,808 n.65 (July 10, 1989).
4
"See supra note 35.43The current list ofNRMSIRs are: Kenny Information Services; Bloomberg Financial
Markets; The Bond Buyer, Disclosure, Inc.; Moody's NRMSIR; and R.R. Donnelly Financial
Municipal Resource Center, which is on the Internet.
"See infra text accompanying notes 65-70 (discussing Rule 15c-2-12(b)(5)).45Disclosure, Inc., Moody's NRMSIR, and R.R. Donnelly were approved subsequent
to the amendment of Rule 15c2-12.
-17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a) (1995).
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Rule are given for offerings in denominations of $100,000 or more if (1)
the securities are sold to no more than thirty-five financially sophisticated
persons with investment intent, (2) the securities are short term debt (nine
months or less), or (3) the securities are "put" securities where the holders
can demand payment at least as frequently as every nine months.47
Accompanying the SEC's Rule 15c2-12 was an interpretive release,
setting forth the Commission's views on the duty of underwriters to make
investigations prior to commencing an offering.4" The SEC
acknowledged that the creation of the MSRB in 1975, and the increased
use of the GFOA's disclosure guidelines following the New York City
crisis, had not had the influence expected on underwriters' behavior with
respect to their obligations to investigate statements contained in the
official statement.49 The SEC recognized that the reasonableness of an
investigation necessary to avoid liability under the antifraud provisions
depends on, among other things, whether the offering is competitively bid
or negotiated.5" However, the test is the same, the underwriter must have
a reasonable basis for belief in the bulk of key representations in the
official statements prepared by the issuer.5 The release specifically
addressed the practical difficulties in performing due diligence
investigations in competitively bid offerings.52
Thus, by 1991, there was a system of federal regulation which
essentially required new offerings to be accompanied by a final official
statement of the issuer, and provided for the distribution of the official
statements to the market either through the NRMSIRs or the MSRB. The
content of the official statements, however, as it related to the issuer,
remained unregulated.
D. Period from 1990 - 1995
The period following the enactment of Rule 15c2-12 continued to
be a time of examination and activity, as the various participants changed
their ways of issuing municipal securities in light of the dictates of the
4717 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d) (1995).4
'Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,100, 53 Fed. Reg,
37,778, 37,787 (Sept. 28, 1988).
49Id. at 37,788.
50 d. at 37,789.
"-Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,100, 53 Fed. Reg.
37,778, 37,789 (Sept. 28, 1988).
"Id. at 37,788-37,789 n.81. The use of competitive bidding is one of the major
differences between the municipal and corporate securities markets.
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Rule. 3 The major questions and issues of compliance revolved around
what constituted a "deemed" final official statement and whether certain
types of remarketings were covered as primary offerings. Structurally,
the roles of financial advisors and underwriters' counsel gained in
importance, and the need for separate issuer securities counsel, apart from
bond counsel, became more apparent.
Having put the regulation of the primary market in place, the SEC
and the MSRB turned their attention to disclosure for the secondary
market and ridding the market of a climate of corruption.
1. Periodic Disclosure
The municipal securities secondary market for trading is
characterized by mystery. There has been little information about the
secondary market in terms of the volume and makeup of the participants
in the market. The traditional view has been that most investors,
including to some extent the banks and insurance companies, hold
municipal securities until maturity.54 To date, trading has not been
significant. Small trades are expensive and discouraged. Those people
who do trade tend to be sophisticated financial entities, trading in large
blocks of securities. The average trading block is estimated to be
$25,000 for individuals and $100,000 for institutions.55  As a
consequence, individuals, even wealthy ones, are not active traders.
In a report on the municipal securities market issued in September
1993, the SEC staff emphasized the need for greater price information to
facilitate trading.56 To this end, the Commission proposed a rule in
March 1994 which would have required disclosure of mark-ups in riskless
principal transactions in municipal securities. 7  Meanwhile, at the
3ft is not the intent of this article to detail and analyze the specific provisions of Rule
15c2-12 and its application over the last five years. Rather, the focus is mor on the structure
of municipal securities regulation and its overall effectiveness. For detailed analysis of Rule
15c2-12, particularly, the provisions relating to primary disclosure. See GELFAND, supra note
27, §§ 8:10-8:10.95.
'See Gellis, supra note 10, at 106-08; see also 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note
9, at 28-31 (discussing the growvth of a secondary market in municipal securities trading and
the need for a system of disclosure to inform secondary purchasers).
5 These are estimates from traders. There is no more specific information available.
sSSee 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-17.
"Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 33,743, 59 Fed. Reg.
12,767 (Mar. 17, 1994).
The confirmation serves several functions: it acts as a customer
invoice; informs investors ofthe details of a transaction, allowing the investor
to check for errors or misunderstandings, provides consumer information,
1996]
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SEC's urging, the MSRB began a pilot program to improve price
transparency for trades between dealers, with the hope that the
information reported by dealers would enable the MSRB to make price
information for municipal securities transactions publicly available on a
next day basis. Phase one of the program covered reported information
on those issues that traded four or more times a day.58 The MSRB
estimated that somewhere between 80 and 350 issues may trade four or
more times a day, with 180 issues as an average. 9 At the time, there
were an estimated 1.5 million municipal issues outstanding.6"
Phase two of the program requires dealers to report daily to the
MSRB all inter-dealer transactions.6' Citing the MSRB pilot program and
other efforts to enhance price transparency by the Public Securities
Association (PSA), the SEC in November 1994 postponed its mark-up
proposal for six months. 62 No action has yet been taken.
On February 28, 1995, the MSRB also amended a number of its
rules to require trades to be settled within three business days of the trade
date, known as T+3. 63 This rule parallels SEC's Rule 15c6-1 under the
1934 Act,64 which mandates T+3 settlement with respect to the settlement
of trades in the corporate securities market.
Finally, but certainly not least of all, in November 1994, the SEC
amended Rule 15c2-12 to add the new paragraphs (b)(5) and (c), 65
requiring continuous disclosure by issuers of municipal securities. Like
the regulation of disclosure in the primary market, the amended Rule
regulates issuers indirectly. Dealers are prohibited from underwriting the
securities of any issuer who does not agree in writing to provide to the
allowing investors to evaluate the cost and quality of the services provided by
broker-dealers; discloses to investors possible conflicts of interest between
them and the broker-dealer; and acts as a safeguard against fraud, by
permitting the customer to detect problems associated with a transaction.
Id.
"SMSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 10,610, at 11,221; id. 10,624, at 11,252.
91d. 10,610, at 11,221.
"'MunicipalSecurities Market, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Congressional Hearings].
61MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 10,637, at 11,294.
"Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,962, 59 Fed. Reg.
59,612 (Nov. 17, 1994).
63MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 10,650, at 11,328.
"Securities Transactions Settlement, Exchange Act Release No. 33,023, 58 Fed. Reg.
52,891 (Oct. 13, 1993).
6"Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,950 (Nov. 10, 1994). These new
provisions became effective July 3, 1995.
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secondary market annual financial information and timely disclosure of
certain material events.66
Carrying through with the structure of disseminating information
through multiple channels, the new provisions call for annual financial
information and operating data [hereinafter referred to collectively as
"annual financial information"] to be provided to each NRMSIR, as well
as to any state information depository (SID) that may exist in the state in
which the issuer is located.67 Annual financial information need not be
filed with the MSRB or the SEC.6" Notices of any of the enumerated
"material events" required by the provisions of paragraph (b)(5)(i)(C) are
to be given to either each NRMSIR or the MSRB and to any SID.69
Industry participants differ as to which route issuers will take, filing with
the NRMSIRs or with the MSRB.
A number of states are reportedly considering setting up
repositories. The SEC, while encouraging the formation of SlDs, has
taken the position that a SID cannot act as a disseminating agent for
issuers; that is, an issuer cannot file its annual financial information with
its SID, and then have the SID forward copies to the NRMSIRs.7' States
can, however, have a separate agent, either a state agency or a private
contractor, act for the issuers and make the requisite filings with the
NRMSIRs.72 This approach has been taken because the SEC wants to
ensure that information contained in the documents is made public at the
same time; it does not want a two stage release, first to the SIDs and then
to the NRMSIRs.73
651d at 85,951.
6'17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i) (1995).
6
'Id69fd
7Lynn Stevens Hume, More Companies Consider Serving as Repositories for
Disclosure Data, THE BOND BuYER, Dec. 2, 1994, at 1, 25.
"Lynn Stevens Hume, SEC Provides "Road Map" for States to Create SIDs, THE
BOND BUYER, July 13, 1995, at 1, 4. As of July 1995, 17 states were considering organizing
SIDs. l
WId.
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There are eleven material events.74 Adopted in large part from the
American Bankers Association guidelines for disclosure by trustees75
which were issued in 1991, the events relate to changes in credit and
market risks, such as defaults, rating changes, and adverse tax actions
with respect to the tax-exempt status of the securities. By its terms, the
Rule does not require notice of any other event not enumerated in Rule
15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(C), although such other event might create potential
liability for fraud under Rule I Ob-5 if that material event was not
disclosed.76
Dealers are required to have access to information regarding these
material events prior to making recommendations to customers.77 They
must establish procedures for securing notices of material events in order
to monitor the events.78
74Section 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(C) lists the material events:
(1) Principal and interest payment delinquencies;
(2) Non-payment related defaults;
(3) Unscheduled draws on debt service reserves reflecting financial
difficulties;
(4) Unscheduled draws on credit enhancement reflecting financial
difficulties;
(5) Substitution of credit or liquidity providers, or their failure to
perform;
(6) Adverse tax opinions or events affecting tax-exempt status of the
security;
(7) Modifications to rights of security holders;
(8) Bond calls;
(9) Defeasances;
(10) Release, substitution, or sale of property securing repayment of the
securities;
(II) Rating changes.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(C) (1995).
"'The guidelines were issued to assist indenture trustees in determining their obligations
to disclose secondary market information. See GELFAND, supra note 27, § 8A:40.
.
76Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,951 n.1 (Nov. 10, 1994). In its
commentary, the SEC stated, "The determination of whether other events also should be the
subject of notification pursuant to the information undertaking is left to the parties." Id. at
85,966. SEC staff have reiterated this position in speeches to industry participants, with the
warning that failure to disclose a material event not specified may be a violation of the
antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. Lynn Stevens Hume, Securities Laws May Require
Issuers to Look Beyond SEC List of Events, THE BOND BUYER, Jan. 31, 1995, at 1, 19.
"Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,951 (Nov. 10, 1994).71Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(c), (g) (1995). The requirement of having procedures
in place became effective January 1, 1996.
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The reaction of the industry to the initial proposal of the rule was
mild. The various interest groups had accepted the fact that some form
of periodic disclosure regulation was inevitable. Prior to the issuance of
the SEC's proposal in March 1994, twelve organizations, including the
GFOA and the PSA, presented ajoint statement on continuing disclosure,
which the SEC used and considered in drafting its proposal.7 Ten of the
twelve organizations joined in presenting a collective response to the
SEC's March proposal,"0 and the National Association of Bond Lawyers
and the National Association of State Treasurers submitted their
individual comments." One of the most interesting comments came from
the MSRB; it urged the SEC to make any periodic disclosure voluntary,
at least until documentation could be standardized. 2
As originally proposed in 1994, dealers would have been prohibited
from selling a municipal security unless they first reviewed the annual
financial information and any material events notices of the particular
issuer, and then disclosed material information.83 Not only would this
have provided persons in the market with current information, it would
have served as an incentive for issuers to comply with their agreements
to supply annual financial information.84
Municipal securities dealers were uniformly opposed to this
provision on the grounds that it was procedurally impossible to
implement; it would make the market less liquid; and it was, in
79See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33,742, 59 Fed. Reg.
12,759 (Mar. 17, 1994). In all, the SEC received nearly 400 comment letters responding to
the SEC's proposal to amend Rule 15c2-12. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act
Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,953
(Nov. 10, 1994).
"'Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,953 (Nov. 10, 1994).
"I1d at 85,953 nn.17-18.
"
2Vicky Stamas, MSRB Chief- Don't Require Disclosure of Periodic Data, THE BOND
BUYER, Aug. 4, 1994, at 1, 5. In the 1993 Congressional Hearings, the then-chair of the
MSRB testified that the MSRB had under consideration rules to encourage voluntary disclosure
by requiring underwriters to recommend to their clients, the issuers, to provide continuing
disclosure to the market. 1993 Congressional Hearings, supra note 60, at 5. The chairman
cited the restrictions of the second clause of the Tower Amendment as a major factor in the
Board's decision not to mandate disclosure. kd at 7. Under the Tower Amendment, the
MSRB, but not the SEC, is prohibited from adopting rules that directly or indirectly require
issuers to produce information. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act ReleaseNo.
33,742, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,759, 12,765 (Mar. 17, 1994). This is undoubtedly the reason for the
regulatory shift from the MSRB to the SEC.
'See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33,742,59 Fed. Reg.
12,759, 12,760-12,764 (Mar. 17, 1994).
84Id.
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substance, duplicative of dealers' existing obligations under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws and MSRB Rule G-19,85 which
requires dealers to have a reasonable basis for recommending a security
to a customer.86 The final Rule deleted this requirement and substituted
the requirement that dealers have procedures for accessing information.87
Also of concern to both the issuers and the dealers was the possible
unintended consequence of creating (or deepening) a two-tier market:
one for the larger, more frequent issuers for whom providing annual
financial information would not be a problem (for they are likely to be
already preparing and distributing such information) and the other for the
small municipal issuers for whom the requirement would be more
onerous. These small issuers would be faced with a choice: incur the
costs to comply or have their securities even less marketable.
To deal with this potential problem, the amendments included a
limited exemption for small issuers. Issuers and "obligated persons," 8
who together have less than $10 million of principal amount of securities
outstanding, including the securities to be issued, are not required to
supply annual financial information. 9 They are, however, required to
"'MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3591 (Rule G-19).
'See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,951-85,954 (Nov. 10, 1994), for the
SEC's description of the commentary it received on this provision of the proposed rule.
"
7See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
"An "obligated person" is any person,
including an issuer of municipal securities, who is either generally or through
an enterprise, fund, or account of such person committed by contract or other
arrangement to support payment of all, or part of the obligations on the
municipal securities to be sold in the Offering (other than providers of
municipal bond insurance, letters of credit, or other liquidity facilities).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(f)(10) (1995). The exemption for bond insurers, issuers ofletters of
credit and providers of liquidity facilities was made on the grounds that annual information as
to these credit issuers is already publicly available. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange
Act Release No. 34,961, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at
85,961 (Nov. 10, 1994).
Under the amended rule, annual financial information and notices of material events
are to be provided for each obligated person. The issuer may or may not be an "obligated
person." The term may include particular parts of the issuer, such as investment funds or a
dedicated stream of revenue. For example, the investment fund involved in the Orange County
financial crisis would have constituted a separate "obligated person" for any borrowings backed
in whole or in part by the fund. While the type of information to be provided on an annual
basis is more or less frozen in time by what has been provided in the final official statement,
the persons who are obligated persons may change over time if the person no longer meets the
definition or the objective criteria initially adopted.
"17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(2)(i) (1995).
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provide notices of material events."0 Similarly, securities offerings of
eighteen months or less are exempt from the filing requirement for annual
financial information, but not from the requirement for filing notices of
material events.9
There are other exemptions from the provisions of paragraph
(b)(5). These exemptions mirror those applicable to primary offerings.9"
Dealers are exempted from their obligations regarding recommendations
when the securities in question were part of a primary offering (1)
exempt because the dollar amount of the original offering was less than
$1 million, or (2) exempt because they were a part of a limited
placement, or short-term debt, or securities "with demand provisions."93
However, dealers are not exempted from their obligations under Rule
15c2-12(c) with respect to securities which have been offered under the
"small issuer" exemption (less than $10 million in aggregate principal
amount of securities outstanding).94 Thus, dealers must assure themselves
as to relevant current information for such securities.
Rule 15c2-12 neither recommends language to be used in the
agreement nor does it specify where the written agreement should be
placed. In the months before July 1, a number of different model
provisions were circulated, as well as different legal advice as to where
the agreement should appear, ranging from the bond itself, the official
statement, the underwriting agreement or a separate document." The
official statement must, however, contain a reference to the agreement
and its content.9
6
2. MSRB Rule G-37
At much the same time as the SEC was considering the regulation
of the secondary market, the MSRB, with considerable support from the
"17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(2)(ii)(B) (1995).
9117 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(3) (1995).
9217 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a), (d)(1) (1995).
317 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(4) (1995).
9417 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(4)(i) (1995).
9 See, e.g., Lynn Stevens Hume, PSA Unveils Draft Language for SEC Disclosure
Rules, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 29, 1995, at 1, 28 (discussing the PSA's models of
undertakings). Separate models were drafted for each of the possible places the undertaking
could be placed: one for inclusion in the indenture, one for inclusion in the bond resolution,
and one for use in conduit transactions. At the same time, draft language was proposed by four
major bond law firms. Under their model, the undertaking required by the rule would be
placed in an independent document. Lynn Stevens Hume, Draft Disclosure Language Pleases
Some, But Not All, THE BOND BuYER, Apr. 3, 1995, at 1, 10.
917 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12()(3) (1995).
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SEC,97 was considering rules to combat what was perceived as an
increasingly corrupt market. In particular, the SEC and the MSRB sought
to eliminate the "pay-to-play" way of doing business with municipal
issuers.9"
In April 1994, the controversial Rule G-37 went into effect.99 Rule
G-37 prohibits underwriters from participating in a negotiated
underwriting of securities of an issuer for a two year period if the dealer
or any of its professional employees contributed monies to any official of
such issuer. °0 Quarterly reports of contributions made and municipal
securities business transacted in the quarter must be filed with the
MSRB.' ° Thus, Rule G-37 operates to limit the well-established practice
of underwriters making significant campaign contributions to public
officials. Enforcement of Rule G-37 is through the monitoring efforts of
the NASD, the SEC, and appropriate bank regulators.
The potential scope and impact of Rule G-37 is wide and, as yet,
undetermined. In an interpretative release, the MSRB made it clear that
there would be few exceptions to the Rule. 2 For example, the
restrictions operated to prohibit members of the municipal finance
industry from contributing to the (albeit short-lived) presidential campaign
of Governor Pete Wilson unless the members forfeited any participation
in the primary negotiated securities offerings of the State of California,
the largest issuer in the country. 3 The Governor petitioned the MSRB
97See, e.g., testimony of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, 1993 Congressional Hearings,
supra note 60, at 5 (discussing how the SEC supports MSRB efforts); see also 1993 SEC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 32-34 (indicating the steps the SEC was taking along with the
MSRB to address the problem of political influences and the staff's reasoning for letting the
MSRB take the lead). The staff expressed the view that since the underwriters' disclosure to
this point had been regulated by the MSRB, it made more sense to let the MSRB act in this
area. Id.
981993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 32-34.
9The SEC approved Rule G-37 on April 7, 1994. Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board, Exchange Act Release No. 33,868, 59 Fed. Reg. 17,621 (Apr. 7, 1994). Its effective
date was April 25, 1994. MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3681 (1995).
"Rule G-37(b), MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3681. The rule also applies to
political action committees of dealers and municipal finance professionals. Id. A limited
exception is made for contributions of not in excess of an aggregate of $250 per official per
election made by any municipal finance professional where the municipal finance professional
is entitled to vote for such official. Id. See also Thomas G. Hilborne, Jr., Rule G-37: The
"Pay to Play" Rule and Its Impact on the Municipal Securities Industry, 26 URB. LAW. 957
(Fall 1994) (discussing the Rule, its background, and its development).
1°1MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3681 (Rule G-37(e)(ii)).
'O°See MSRB Interpretations, MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3681, at 5423-36.
"13Lynn Stevens Hume, California Governor Wilson Seeks Relief From MSRB Rule G-
37, THE BOND BUYER, May 10, 1995, at 1, 32.
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for an exemption from the Rule, but was denied.' Governor Wilson
also argued that if Rule G-37 applied to him, the Rule applied to
President Clinton because the President named persons to a fiscal
monitoring board for Washington, D.C. The MSRB ruled that Rule G-37
did not apply to federal officials. S
While the reform had the solid support of the SEC and municipal
securities dealers (many of whom, while the proposal was pending,
agreed voluntarily not to make political contributions), 6 issuers, whose
officials would be negatively affected, were not as keen. In fact, the
enactment of Rule G-37 has served to focus issuers' dissatisfaction with
the MSRB, bringing calls for more issuer representatives on the Board
and more open meetings.107 Rule G-37 was also opposed strongly by
minority and female-dealer firms on the grounds that the Rule secures the
existing "old boy" network of financiers and leaves the newcomers
effectively out of the competition!0
Finally, the Rule was challenged in the courts by a municipal
securities dealer, on the grounds that Rule G-37 unconstitutionally
restricts freedom of speech of dealers and violates the Tenth
Amendment." 9 The U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, however, held
that Rule G-37 was constitutional." 0 The court did discuss with
skepticism the relevance of political contributions to the interests of
investors."' The plaintiff, with the support of the National Association
of Bond Lawyers, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court and was denied in
April of 1996."' Also of importance, the court rejected the argument of
'°4Lynn Stevens Hume, Wilson Must Abide by Rule G-37. MSRB Informs Campaign
Counsel, THE BoND BUYER, June 1, 1995, at 1, 7.
1"sld
"During the period between the proposal of Rule G-37 and its final approval, over 50
firms agreed to support a voluntary ban on contributions sponsored by the PSA. Charles
Gasparino, MSRB s Clapp Sees Continued Voluntary Ban Despite Imminent Arrival of Group 's
Rule G-37, THE BOND BuYER, Mar. 8, 1994, at 1, 8.
"'See, e.g., Vicky Stamas, GFOA Panel Votes to Send Letter Criticizing Secrecy of
MSRB Meetings, THE BOND BuYER, June 7, 1994, at 9.
.. Brad AltmanMinority Firms, Not "Pay to Play"Are G-37°s Target, Treasurer Says,
THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 31, 1994, at 1, 4; Sharon R. King, Tindell Pans MSRB 's Position on
Blacks at Civil Rights Probe, THE BOND BuYER, Sept. 22, 1994, at 1, 24. In response to
criticisms of the make-up of the Board, the current chair of the Board is a woman (the first to
be chair); and the Board has its first minority member (also a woman).
'Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1351 (1996).
See also Hilbome, supra note 100 (discussing the theory and development bchind the rule).
"'Blount, 61 F.3d at 949.
.Id at 947-48.
"2Blount v. SEC, 116 S. Ct. 1351 (1996).
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the SEC and MSRB that Rule G-37 was a private rule of self-regulatory
organizations, and held that it was a government rule.'
Enforcement of the Rule is mainly through the offices of the
NASD, which, at least at the regional level, seem to take a less stringent
approach to violations than does the MSRB.1 4 A recent survey
conducted by The Bond Buyer revealed that a number of firms had failed
to comply with the filing requirements of Rule G-37." 5
The MSRB has also enacted another rule, Rule G-38," 6 effective
March 18, 1996, to require disclosure of any arrangements with other
persons to assist the dealer in securing an issuer's securities business.
The proposed rule first requires that all arrangements with "consultants"
be in writing, specifying the services to be performed and the terms of
payment, and be entered into prior to the performance of any services.
t 17
Second, the existence of such arrangements must be disclosed in writing
to the issuer."' Third, quarterly reports are required to be filed with the
MSRB which disclose all arrangements entered into, even if the dealer
was ultimately unsuccessful. 9
'"Blount, 61 F.3d at 941.
"In a recent examination of a brokerage firm's violation of Rule G-37, where a
member of the firm made a large political contribution to the campaign of George Pataki for
Governor of New York, and then participated in an offering for a New York state agency, the
NASD Local District Business Conduct Committee did not impose sanctions. Lynn Stevens
Hume & Karen Pierog, NASD Committee Calls Firm Reckless Over G-37, THE BOND BUYER,
Oct. 5, 1995, at 1, 21; Lynn Stevens Hume, Lawyer Says G-37 Ruling Shows Up Flaw In
Process, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 10, 1995, at 1, 4. The dealer argued that the contribution had
been made on behalf of the dealer's wife and was unintentional. Id. Both the MSRB and
executive committee of the NASD indicated that the decision was too lenient. Id. The NASD
has announced it will increase its enforcement efforts vis-ai-vis municipal securities market.
Michael Stanton, NASD Head: Restructuring Likely to Intensify Oversight, THE BOND BUYER,
Nov. 22, 1995, at 1, 3. More recently, the SEC censured the NASD for failure to enforce Rule
G-37. The NASD again agreed to increase its enforcement efforts and is creating a post for
a municipal compliance expert. Lynn Stevens Hume, NASD to Get Compliance Guru for Boost
in Muni Enforcement, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 13, 1996, at 1, 4; Lynn Stevens Hume, SEC
Slams NASD as Failing to Enforce G-37 Adequately, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 9, 1996, at 1,
7.
"'Under Rule G-37, quarterly reports are required if the dealer did any negotiated
underwritings of municipal securities or made any campaign contributions or both during the
quarter. MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3681 (Rule G-37(e)). The Bored Buyer survey
found a gap between the number of negotiated underwritings reported in 1995 and the number
of firms making Rule G-37 quarterly reports. Lynn Stevens Hume, Dozen of Firms are Not
Complying with Rule G-37, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 25, 1995, at 1, 28.
"
6MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3686, at 5481 (1996).
117Id.
"Id.
"91d.
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The purpose of Rule G-38 is to discourage a wide variety of
financial arrangements, including finder's fees and kick-backs, which are
often involved in the marketing of municipal securities. The MSRB and
the SEC argue that these practices increase the issuer's costs and taint the
market. 120
As with Rule G-37, the proposed Rule G-38 was quite
controversial.' 2' The GFOA, PSA, and other groups opposed the rule
maintaining that it is not needed - that the concerns could be handled
with an amendment to Rule G-37. The National Association of Bond
Lawyers objected to the scope of the term "consultants," which
potentially brings lawyers and accountants under the rule's limits.,' In
response to the criticisms, the MSRB withdrew its initial proposal and,
in September 1995, filed a revised proposed rule that has a narrower
definition of "consultants."'1
24
Finally, the American Bar Association and the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York are looking into rules governing campaign
contributions by lawyers."z
In terms of enforcement actions against pay-to-play activities, the
SEC staff reported in May 1995 that the SEC had almost two dozen on-
going enforcement investigations. 26  In recent months, the SEC has
reached multi-million dollar settlements against dealers, including Lazard
Freres and Merrill Lynch. 27
"'MSRB NALuAL, supra note 19, 10,658, at 11,348 (Rule G-38).
' Lynn Stevens Hume, MSRB Offers Rule Defining Consultants Narrowly, THE BOND
BUYER, Sept. 29, 1995, at 1, 29.
123Id.
"'id. The new proposal made clear that the term "consultant" did not cover attorneys
or accountants hired to assist in a particular municipal securities transaction unless that
assistance takes the form of acting as a "finder." d
"'The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has recommended adoption of
a rule prohibiting political contributions and the ABA is studying the question. Lynn Stevens
Hume, NABL Seeks Lawyers' Vievs On Pay-to-Play Policy, Issues, THE BOiD BuYER, Oct. 25,
1995, at 3.
" 
6Lynn Stevens Hume, Bonds'Risk ofiBeing Taxed Must be Disclosed, SEC Says, THE
BOND BUYER, May 12, 1995, at 1, 28 (reporting on a statement made at a meeting of the
National Association of Bond Lawyers by an assistant director of the SEC enforcement
division). In September 1995, the director of the SEC Office of Municipal Securities stated
that the office had more investigations underway than the number reported earlier in May 1995.
Four of the five lawyers in the new division have experience in enforcement. Lynn Stevens
Hume, SEC Activities in Enforcement for Municipals Have Increased, THE BO,'D B YER,
Sept 21, 1995, at 1, 23.
""See Wayne, supra note 4, at DI, D4, for discussion of the two large settlements and
other enforcement actions pending at the SEC. Efforts are being stepped up by the other
regulators. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is investigating the
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3. Other Regulation
In light of the losses incurred by state and local governments in
derivative securities, the issue of suitability or "know thy customer" rules
were reviewed by a number of bodies, including the NASD and GFOA,
to determine the appropriate standard for sales of securities to institutions:
in particular, state and local governments, as opposed to individuals.
These losses raised concern about the duties owed to such institutions by
securities dealers. A new NASD rule makes clear that dealers have an
obligation of making sure securities are suitable for the customer, without
regard to whether the customer is a person or an institutional account.'
Recognizing, however, that institutions may have better capabilities for
evaluating risks, the rule permits dealers to weigh this factor in
determining suitability.
PART Two - How THE SYSTEM WORKS
The bankruptcy and default of Orange County provides an
opportunity to examine how well the current system of regulation
operates. This part first discusses what information exists as to the
effects of the enactment of federal securities regulations on municipal
securities disclosure, and then, turns more specifically to analyze the
disclosure made by Orange County as an issuer in its public offerings
prior to its filing for bankruptcy.
A. Studies/Cases
There is very little in the way of empirical studies of the quality
of municipal disclosure since the adoption of Rule 15c2-12 in 1989.
possible violation ofRule G-37 by First Tennessee Bank because two top executives were listed
on invitations for a fundraiser for the Governor as vice chairs of the dinner. See supra note
114 and accompanying text. The Justice Department successfully prosecuted a municipal
securities consultant, involved in "pay-to-play" activities, for violations of the antifraud
disclosure provisions. Mark Ferber was found guilty of 58 counts. Christina Pretto & Angela
Shah, Jurors Find Ferber Guilty 58 Times Over, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 12, 1996, at 1.
'
28NASD RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE art. III, see. 2; see Joanne Morrison, GFOA Says
Sales Practice Rules Improved But Need Strengthening, THE BOND BUYER, May 18, 1995, at
3; Joanne Morrison, NASD Announces Rules That Place Suitability Burden on Broker-Dealers,
THE BOND BUYER, July 18, 1995, at 1, 27; see also Richard Y. Roberts, Reforming the
Municipal Securities Market, 15 MUN. FIN. J. 1, 3-4 (Summer 1994) (discussing the recent
increase in the number of individual investors in the municipal securities market). The SEC
approved the NASD rule in August 1996. Joanne Morrison, SEC Says Yes to Rules Putting
Onus on Dealers, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 22, 1996, at 1.
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Most market participants, including the SEC and the MSRB, believe that
the Rule has been effective and are reasonably satisfied with the level of
disclosure in the primary market. However, one area in which municipal
issuers traditionally have been weak is the meaningful disclosure of
financial information. There is evidence that local governments have
improved their financial reporting, although there still exists the problem
of lack of uniform reporting practices. 129  The MSRB response to the
SEC's proposal to amend Rule 15c2-12 to call for periodic disclosure
cited the lack of uniformity in the presentation of financial information
as the major reason for its position that the program for secondary
disclosure should be voluntary, at least initially. 30
There are no reported cases relating to the enforcement of Rule
15c2-12 by the SEC. Although dealers complain that issuers are laggard
in providing underwriters sufficient quantities of their official statements
to meet their obligations,' participants in the market have noted that,
until very recently, efforts to enforce the Rule and the MSRB rules,
generally, have been all but non-existent 2 The SEC annual reports for
the years 1990-1994 list no significant fraud cases against municipal
issuers or dealers. A list of fraud cases appended to the 1993 Staff
Report consisted of eight cases, all brought against dealers; none of these
cases involved Rule 15c2-12 and only one related to misrepresentations
made in connection with primary offerings. 3 As previously discussed,
SEC enforcement actions have greatly increased during Chairman Levitt's
tenure at the Commission. 34
12'Arthur Allen & George D. Sanders, Measuring Progress: A Reexamination of
Municipal Accounting Disclosure, 15 MUN. FIN. J. 32,47 (Spring 1994) (discussing a survey,
which found that accounting reports had improved but that there vas little change in financial
statement disclosures). In particular, the percentages of cities disclosing specific subject items
remained much the same. id
"OStamas, supra note 82, at 5.
"'Ann Brashear, SEC Interpretive Release and Proposed Rules on Municipal
Disclosure, 15 MuN. FrN. J. 1, 6 (Fall 1994); Southern Municipal Finance Society,
Comprehensive Program for Market, Regulatory and Legislative Action, reprinted in 12 Mti.
FIN. J. 68, 84 (Spring 1991).
"'See, e.g., Southern Municipal Finance Society, supra note 131, reprinted in 12 MuN.
FIN. J. at 83 (recommending modification ofTower Amendment to deal %%ith "lax" enforcement
of MSRB rules dealing with disclosure).
.'See 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, app. D, at 2.
"
4See supra notes 4, 6 & 128. The increase in SEC activity has been so great in the
last two years that municipal securities issuers and dealers have become alarmed and are
beginning to resist the SEC's efforts. Lynn Stevens Hume, PS4 Warns SEC on NewStandards
in Denver Bond Probe, THE BOND BuYER, Jan. 18, 1996, at 1, 32.
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B. Orange County
The ink was barely dry on the SEC's 1994 amendment to Rule
15c2-12 when Orange County, California announced that its $20 billion
investment pool (Investment Pool) had incurred $1.7 billion in investment
losses. The Investment Pool was made up of funds from 187 local
governments, in addition to those of the County. All but approximately
$8 billion of the $20 billion were borrowed funds. 3
The subsequent filing for bankruptcy on December 6, 1994 by
Orange County, one of the wealthiest counties in the United States, 3 6 and
the Investment Pool raises issues concerning the adequacy of disclosure
in the primary market and the trading practices of municipal securities
dealers.
Orange County's fiscal crisis also poses some very familiar
questions. How was it that no one knew of the extent of Orange
County's losses, despite two public offerings of securities by the County
and a number of public offerings by other investment pool investor-local
governments, within six months of the filing for bankruptcy? In June and
July of 1994, Orange County and the other entities in the Investment Pool
issued $900 million in debt.' Orange County's second public offering
was as late as September 1994.' There has been testimony before state
officials that the losses existed and were known by Orange County's bond
counsel at least by October.
...See James Sterngold, Orange County Bankruptcy: The Poor Feel the Most Pain,
N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at Al; G. Bruce Knecht, Derivatives Lead to Huge Loss in Public
Fund, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A3 (reporting on the announcements of Orange County's
losses). See also Arthur Levitt, The Municipal Bond and Government Securities Market, 16
MUN. FIN. J. 6, 8-13 (Summer 1995) (discussing the nature of the investment pool participants
and the nature of the pool's investments); The Municipal Securities Markets: Hearings Before
the Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 26, 1995), 1995
WL 441680 (SEC) (testimony of Paul S. Maco, Director, Office of Municipal Securities, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission) (discussing the effect of Orange County's bankruptcy
on the municipal securities market and astep-by-step analysis ofthe events and decisions which
led to the County's bankruptcy).
"'
6Orange County has a population of 2.6 million where the medium income is 60%
above the national average. Its economy is the 28th largest in the world. Michael Utley, One
Year Later, Crisis Looms Large for the Market, Not for the Public, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 6,
1995, at 1, 6.
"
7Jeffrey Taylor, SEC is Probing Orange County on Two Fronts, WALL ST. J., Dee. 7,
1994, at A3.
"'Official Statement, County of Orange, California, Dated Sept. 26, 1994,
$320,040,000 Taxable Pension Obligation Bonds, Series 1994 A ($209,840,000) and Series
1994 B ($110,200,000) [hereinafter September Official Statement].
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Certainly, the County's financial advisors, its underwriters, and the
rating agencies should have been aware of the size of Orange County's
portfolio invested in high risk derivative securities. Consequently, how
could Orange County's securities be rated AA-Minus by Standard &
Poors and AA by Moody's right up to the time of bankruptcy? 39 To
what extent were the dealers, in particular Merrill Lynch, who sold
derivative securities to Orange County, violating their fiduciary duties as
financial advisors, as well as the MSRB's suitability rules? To what
extent were state and local governments, which invested large amounts
of money, sophisticated investors in terms of the application of these
rules?
These questions go to the heart of municipal securities regulation,
without regard to whether the County is ultimately found to have violated
the antifraud provisions of Rule lOb-5. An uninformed market and "A"
ratings up until disaster is characteristic of major municipal securities
defaults, namely, New York City in 1974 and WPPSS in 1988.1,
1. Background
The investment of the local governments' pooled funds was in the
hands of one elected official, the Treasurer of Orange County. For over
twenty years, the Treasurer, Robert Citron, managed the Investment Pool
essentially without supervision. Beginning in the 1980s, Citron began
investing in what are known as derivative securities and in reverse
repurchase agreements.
Derivative securities can be broadly defined as "financial
instruments whose value is derived from or based upon the value of
another security or on the level of an index."'' At the time of the
bankruptcy, Orange County had approximately 42.5% of the Investment
Pool's portfolio of $20 billion invested in derivatives, of which 80%
consisted of "inverse floaters."'14 2 Inverse floaters are volatile securities
"'Asked to explain these ratings, both rating agencies said that they were avare of
some losses, but that the County had not told them of the severity of the losses. Charles
Gasparino, Rating Agencies Scheduled to See County Officials, THE BOD BUYER, Dec. 9,
1994, at 1, 7; Leslie Wayne, Municipal Bond Regulation Debated at House Hearing, N.Y.
Tmis, July 27, 1995, at D4.
"See, e.g., WPPSS SEC REPORT, supra note 2, and NEw YoRK SEC REPORT, supra
note 2, for a discussion of the events and circumstances of these two fiscal crises.
14'Gary Gray & Patrick Cusatis, Understanding and Valuing Municipal Derivatire
Securities, 14 MuN. FIN. J. 1, 2 (Summer 1993). See also Levitt, supra note 135, at 10-12
(explaining risks inherent in investing in derivatives and reverse repurchase agreements).
'Knecht, supra note 135, at A3.
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whose yield goes down when the market interest rate goes up and vice
versa. 1
43
Orange County borrowed money and encouraged other County
units, such as school districts, to do so, by issuing taxable notes to invest
in derivatives. In fact, the County had issued $600 million of taxable
notes for this purpose in July 1994. These securities were not tax exempt
because municipal securities issued for the purpose of arbitraging interest
rates do not qualify for the federal tax exemption.'44
The Investment Pool did well in earlier years, providing an average
yield of over 10.1% for fifteen years.'45 However, beginning in 1994,
market interest rates started to go up. Because the securities held by
Orange County were inversely tied to the market interest rates, their value
plummeted. Mr. Citron resigned on December 4, 1994, and has since
pleaded guilty to defrauding investors and misappropriating government
funds in violation of California law.
Both Orange County and the Investment Pool filed for
bankruptcy.'46 These filings allowed the County to hold off both the
bondholders, as its creditors, and other local government investors, by
preventing other pool members from immediately withdrawing funds
from the Investment Pool. In May 1995, Orange County and over 100
local governments agreed to a settlement in which the County would
ultimately give the local government investors 1000 on the dollar, but
only 770 immediately.'47 Bondholders argued that this settlement gave
141"Inverse floaters are, in effect, another way to borrow at short-term rates and invest
at long-term rates." Laura Jereski & Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Orange County Borrowed $1
Billion Even as its Investment Losses Piled Up, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A3.
'An arbitrage bond is one where the proceeds are invested in obligations having a
yield higher than the yield on the bonds. I.R.C. § 148(a) (1988).
'
45Knecht, supra note 135, at A4.
"'The filing for bankruptcy by Orange County under Chapter 9 is by far the largest
municipal bankruptcy. In 1991, Bridgeport, Connecticut, attempted to file for bankruptcy but
the city never went through the process because of state opposition.
The Orange County filing raises the question of the meaning of the "full faith and
credit" guaranty on municipal general obligation bonds. The concept that the issuer will use
all of its resources, i.e., taxing power, to repay its guaranteed debt, underlies the traditional
municipal securities market. Doubts concerning the guaranty undercut the credit-worthiness
of these bonds. In July 1995, a federal district court overruled the bankruptcy court and held
that Orange County could not ignore its obligations to set aside revenues which secured tax and
revenue anticipation notes ('Tans" and "Rans") previously issued. Lynn Stevens Hume, Market
Lauds Court Ruling on Orange County Notes, THE BOND BUYER, July 17, 1995, at 36. Tans
and Rans are known as "double barrel" securities in that they are general obligation securities
and provide the noteholders with a lien on the issuer's revenues as they are received.
'..Michael Utley, Judge Rules Pool's Bankruptcy Filing Invalid But Impact is Mostly
Academic, THE BOND BUYER, May 26, 1995, at 36.
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the governments a preference over bondholders' claims on the pooled
funds. 4 Subsequent to the disbursement of funds from the pool to its
government investors, a bankruptcy judge ruled that the Investment Pool,
as a separate entity, was not a "local government" under Chapter Nine of
the Bankruptcy Act and not entitled to its protection.'49 By that time, the
settlement money had already been disbursed. 5'
2. Misery Loves Company
The magnitude of the losses and the subsequent filing for
bankruptcy landed Orange County in the spotlight. But, it was far from
the only government with investment losses from derivative securities.
Local governments in Maryland, Ohio, and Wisconsin, to name a few,
lost substantial amounts of money through derivative holdings.' For
example, the State of Wisconsin's pooled investment fund, with funds
from over 1,000 local governments in addition to the State, lost $95
million due to its investment in derivatives. 52
In a situation very similar to that of Orange County, the state of
West Virginia is currently seeking to recover part of its almost $300
million of losses against the investment bankers who sold the fund
derivatives.'53 Six dealers, all major investment banking firms, settled by
paying the state a total of $28 million. 154 Morgan Stanley refused to
settle and was sued by West Virginia.5 5 This lawsuit was carefully
monitored by the municipal securities market. The state was successful
i"Hume, supra note 146, at 36; Testimony of Paul Maco, supra note 135, app. A n.25.
49Utley, supra note 147, at 36.
'sold
.'Lynn Stevens Hume, Count LawsuitSeeks to Regain Funds lnvested in Derivatives,
THE Bon BUYER, Aug. 24, 1994, at I (entire portfolio of Charles County, Maryland, was
invested in derivatives sustaining $30 million of losses); Karen Pierog, Derivatives Losses in
Wisconsin Pool May Induce Towns to Bring Lawsuit, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 27, 1995, at 1
[hereinafter Pierog, Derivative Losses] ($95 million losses related to derivatives); Karen Pierog,
Ohio Treasurer Urges Ban on Municipal Investment Pools, Use of Derivatives, THE BOND
BuYER, Jan. 4, 1995, at 2 (Cuyahoga County had losses of S114 million connected with
leveraged investments); Donald Yacoe, Greenwood County. S.C., Treasurer Quits After Fund
Suffers Derivatives Losses, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 15, 1994, at I (paper losses to an S8A
million trust fund).
"..Pierog, Derivative Losses, supra note 151, at 1.
"'Leslie Wayne, BigRisks, BigLosses, Big Fight, N.Y. TLmES, Apr. 23, 1995, see. 3,
at C1, C16.
"'Ld. at C16.
...Id.; see Joanne Morrison, Judge Reiterates Morgan is Liablefor State's Losses, THE
BOND BUYER, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1, 5.
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in the lower court in obtaining a judgment of $56 million." 6 Morgan
Stanley was found liable on the ground that the sale of the high risk
securities violated state statutes that specify the types of investments local
governments are authorized to purchase.157 On appeal, the West Virginia
Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the basis that the instructions
to the jury were wrong. 5 To the extent the jury found Morgan Stanley
liable, the jury would determine whether the $56 million in losses should
be offset by the gains made by the fund in trades done through Morgan
Stanley. Morgan Stanley and West Virginia finally agreed to a settlement
of $20 million.'59
As with Orange County, the investment of the West Virginia fund
was left under the control of one individual. 60 That person was Kathryn
Lester, who had little, if any, formal financial background., 61 Made
director of investments in 1983, she had control over the $2.2 billion
fund.'62 Prior to her employment by West Virginia, Ms. Lester had been
a secretary in a bank in Washington. 63 There she became involved in
government bond trading and was appointed as an assistant bond trader
at the bank.' She was at that job from 1981 to 1983.'65 In 1983 she
moved to West Virginia and obtained a job in the State Treasurer's
office. 16 6 A New York Times article about West Virginia's woes recounts
that "[s]ince the director of investments knew nothing about bonds, she
started to educate him."'67 When the director resigned at the end of 1983,
Ms. Lester was appointed to succeed him. 6'
Like Mr. Citron in Orange County, Ms. Lester was encouraged by
her own initial success to invest more and more in derivatives.'69 When
these high rollers were successful, no one looked at the risks inherent in
'
56Wayne, supra note 153, at C16.
157Id.
'Joanne Morrison, Morgan Stanley, West Virginia Reach $20 Million Settlement, TtiE
BOND BUYER, Aug. 15, 1996, at 1, 6; Joanne Morrison, West Virginia's Top Court Won't
Rehear Morgan Case, THE BOND BUYER, July 20, 1995, at 1, 5.
'-
59Morison, Morgan Stanley, supra note 158, at 1.
"6°Wayne, supra note 153, at CI.
161 d at C16.
1621d, at C1.
1631d. at C16.
'"Wayne, supra note 153, at C16.
1651d.
16Id.
1
671d.
'
6 Wayne, supra note 153, at C 16.
1691d.
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their investment policies. 7 ' The responses of Orange County and West
Virginia are also quite similar. As with \Vest Virginia and Ms. Lester,
Orange County and Mr. Citron, specifically, put much of the blame on
their investment banking firm, Merrill Lynch' and sued the firm for $2
billion for its losses.' Unlike the \Vest Virginia case against Morgan
Stanley, in 1979 Mr. Citron lobbied for, and obtained, a change in
California's applicable statute to allow local governments to invest in
certain type of derivatives. 73 Therefore, the basis of Orange County's
suit was inadequate disclosure of risks and violations of Merrill Lynch's
fiduciary duties as financial advisor to the County. 74 In the days
immediately after the announcement, the SEC began an investigation. In
addition, a number of lawsuits have been filed by bondholders against
Orange County and Merrill Lynch. 75
Orange County and its local governments had $800 million in
short-term notes maturing in the period between June -August 1995.276
The options open to Orange County were limited in that California
constitutional restraints on raising property taxes eliminated the prospect
of increasing property taxes to raise money to pay its obligations.
Instead, Orange County proposed to raise its sales tax one-half of 1% in
order to avoid default.'77 A consensus against new taxes, however,
continued to color the Orange County taxpayers' response to the financial
straits of the government; the tax was not approved.""8 Subsequent to the
vote, Orange County came to an agreement with the noteholders to
extend maturity of the notes coming due in 1995 for one year, in
exchange for additional interest and a bonus payment upon maturity. 79
1701d,
"'Leslie Wayne, Merrill Lynch Faces a Barrage of Orange County La suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at DI.
17Id.
"The change in the state statute added reverse repurchase agreements as authorized
investments. The list was expanded again in 1992 to include a number of other structured
obligations. Levitt, supra note 135, at 18.
"'See Wayne, supra note 171, at DI.
'llhere are over 10 lavsuits against Merrill Lynch alone. Various actions against
Orange County are tied up in the bankruptcy proceedings. See Wayne, supra note 171, at DI.
"7'Michael Utley, Note Default Sends Tremors Through Municipal Market, THtE BOND
BuYER, July 10, 1995, at 1, 2.
r"Id,
"'Sixty-one percent of voters voted against the proposed sales tax. Id.
17The roll-over agreement was approved by 98% of noteholders on July 10, 1995.
Michael Utley, Creditors Approve One-Year Rollover, But Raters Deem Notes in Default, THE
BOND BUYER, July 11, 1995, at 1. There are approximately 800 noteholders, 90% are held by
20 institutional investors; 10% are held by retail investors. Michael Utley, Noteholders Will
Vote Today on One-Year Rollover Plan, THE BOND BuYER, July 7, 1995, at 1, 28.
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In the aftermath of the referendum on the sales tax, an Orange County
chief executive, who had been appointed in December to head the
County's efforts to right its troubled financial affairs, resigned.
Technically, the declaration of bankruptcy and renegotiation of the
terms of the notes placed Orange County in default. 8 ' County officials
have argued that the agreement reached with the noteholders prior to an
actual failure to pay saved it from being considered in default.' Market
participants, particularly the rating agencies, rejected this argument, and
continue to rate the County's securities as being in default.'
How well did the existing system function? Clearly, there had
been a loss in market value for all holders of the County's debt. The
losses of the Investment Pool, the bankruptcy, and subsequent agreements
to extend maturity, would all be "events" to be reported under the new
Rule 15c2-12(b)(5)(C).' 83 Although the County had two public offerings
in the six month period preceding the public announcement of the
Investment Pool's losses in December 1994,184 review of the official
statements for these offerings yields little information about the
Investment Pool at all. Certainly, there was no mention or discussion of
any experienced losses even though the facts show that increased losses
began in spring 1994.185
'"Utley, Creditors Approve One-Year Rollover, supra note 179, at 1.
"'Id. at 7.
12 Id.
'8317 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(C).
"'See September Official Statement, supra note 138; Official Statement, County of
Orange, California, Dated July 1, 1994, $600 Million 1994-95 Taxable Notes [hereinafter July
Official Statement].
"'Questions about the strength of the Pool's investments surfaced in the spring of
1994. In April 1994, Citron told The Wall Street Journal that he had been forced by rising
interest rates to meet $140 million of "collateral calls." Knecht, supra note 135, at A4. In
May 1994, SEC officials from the Los Angeles office met with the Orange County Treasurer
concerning the Pool's heavy investment in leveraged securities. Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Probed
Orange County Investments Just Months Before the Fund's Collapse, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,
1994, at A2.
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3. Review of Disclosure Documents
a. Official Statement, Dated July 1, 1994, $600 Million Taxable
Notes, Rated by Standard and Poor's A-]+ by Moody's P-1
1. Terms of Notes
The taxable notes were general obligation notes, payable from the
County's general revenue fund, 86 which were to mature on July 10,
1995.187 Proceeds of the notes were placed in a "Repayment Fund."'
The Repayment Fund was to be invested in the County's Investment
Pool.8 9 Interest on the investment of the Repayment Fund above the
interest payable on the notes went into the County's general fund."a The
only purpose of this offering was to borrow money to arbitrage the
difference in interest rates between the County's borrowing costs and the
yield on the Investment Pool, a technique known as leveraging.'9' This
use of borrowed funds increases the riskiness of an investment because
it magnifies the consequences of an interest rate drop on the investments
vis-A-vis the borrower's interest obligations on the borrowed funds."92 It
has been estimated that leverage used with inverse floaters tripled the
riskiness of Orange County's investments. 1
93
2. Participants
The issuance was underwritten by Merrill Lynch in a negotiated
offering. 9 4  Orange County was also advised by Leifer Capital, Inc.,
"financial and marketing specialists,"'95 which was represented by the lawv
firm of Brown and Wood. 96 There is no mention of underwriters
counsel, but Brown and Wood was also Merrill Lynch's general outside
counsel. In the aftermath of the disclosure of losses, it appears that
"6July Official Statement, supra note 184, at cover page.
" 
71d2
188Id. at 2-3.
' at 9-10.
"'July Official Statement, supra note 184, at 3.
"'Laura Jereski & Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Orange County Borrowed SI Billion Even
as Its Investment Losses Piled Up, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A3.
9Id.
193Id
"
19Id. at A4.
"'July Official Statement, supra note 184, at 3.
"'Ild
"
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Merrill Lynch employees in its Los Angeles office contributed $1,000
each to Mr. Citron's reelection campaign in June 1994, in contravention
of MSRB Rule G-37. 197
3. Disclosure
The official statement contained a separate section for a description
of the Investment Pool, as well as a separate section on "Special Risks."
The description of the pool disclosed that its portfolio was valued at
original cost, not marked to market, and that the portfolio also consisted
of:
a mixture of various fixed and floating rate securities. From
time to time, a significant portion of these securities are
pledged with respect to reverse repurchase agreements
authorized by law. The price and income volatility of the
above securities is greater than standard fixed income
securities and may serve to increase the volatility of the
County Investment Pool's return and market value in various
interest rate environments as well as serve as a hedge in
other interest rate environments. 98
The section also contained a tabulation of the pool's returns for the
FY 1990-91 to March of FY 1993-94. The table shows a decline from
8.52% for FY 1992-93 to 7.80% for FY 1993-94 through March 31,
1994.' There was nothing more specific concerning any losses already
incurred, collateral calls, or decreases in cash as a result of collateral
calls. The magnitude of its holdings of derivative securities was not
mentioned. The section covering "investment risk" under the Special
Risks section stated:
The County intends to invest moneys held in the Repayment
Fund in the County Investment Pool. If the County
Investment Pool suffers an overall investment loss on the
portfolios, Pledged Moneys may be insufficient to pay the
197Three Merrill Employees Gave in County Election, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1994, atA6.
See MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3681 (Rule G-37).
gJuly Official Statement, supra note 184, at 10. Valuing investments at original cost
means gain and losses are not reflected until securities are sold. Id. at 9. Governmental
Accounting Standards Board's standards do not specify a method for measuring value.
'991d. at 10.
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principal of and interest on the Notes. In the event of a
deficiency the Resolution provides that such deficiency shall
be satisfied and made up by the County from any lawfully
available money received in or attributable to fiscal year
1994-95.200
b. Official Statement, Dated September 26, 1994 $320,040,000
Taxable Pension Obligation Bonds, Series 1994 A ($209,840,000)
and Series 1994 B ($110,200,000), Series A Were Rated AA- and
Al by Standard and Poors and Moody's, Respectively. Series B
Were Rated AA-/AI+ and A1/VMIGI, Respectively.
1. Terms of Bonds
The Taxable Pension Obligation Bonds were issued to secure
Orange County's obligation in the amount of $318 million to the Orange
County Employees Retirement System.201 The bonds were a hybrid
municipal security."' The County's obligation to repay the debt was
absolute and unconditional and the payment was not limited to any
specific source of revenues. 3 But, they are not backed by the taxing
power of Orange County. Thus, they were modified general obligation
bonds or a variation of the moral obligation bond.2
The series A Bonds were interest rate swaps.2 5 Orange County
agreed with the swap provider that the County would pay to the swap
provider on each interest payment date, a variable amount based on the
market rate, while receiving a fixed amount from the swap provider."'
The series B bonds were variable rate bonds with "put" rights for
bondholders when the interest rate is reset pursuant to the terms of the
securities. The series B bonds were also subject to optional andmandatory redemptions.0 8 Part of the security for the redemption
201d at 11.
2
'September Official Statement, supra note 138, at i.2 2I at 3-4.
2°3Id at i.
"A moral obligation bond is one where the government issuer, although not legally
bound to pay the bond, agrees to appropriate sufficient funds to make up any deficiencies in
the monies available to pay principal and interest. DANIEL MANDEUKER Er A.., STATE ArD
LocAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTENi 321 (3d ed. 1990).
2
.September Official Statement, supra note 138, at 3.
' 1d.
2071d. at 5-6.
20'la at 10-11.
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payments on the series B bonds was the County's portion of the
Investment Pool.
20 9
2. Participants
The managing underwriters were CS First Boston; Kidder, Peabody
& Co. and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette."' ° The underwriters' counsel
was a California firm who had, on other occasions, represented Orange
County.2 ' Bond counsel had also represented the underwriters in other
unrelated transactions. These relationships were disclosed in the official
statement. Also, participating in the offering was O'Brien Partners, Inc.,
as financial advisor.21 2
3. Disclosure
The September Statement, like the July Statement, contained a
section on the Investment Pool, entitled "The Orange County Treasurer's
Investment Pool" (a prescient title).1 3 Oddly enough, the September
Statement did not track the earlier July Statement, as one might have
expected given the short time period between these offerings. The
description of the Investment Pool in the September Statement started out
with a general sentence to the effect that the County's "investment policy
focuses on retaining the safety of investment principal while earning
satisfactory yields., 214 It went on to provide:
The Treasurer provides investment services for
approximately 180 separate local government agencies
through the operation and management of the [Orange]
County Pool. Each of these agencies has different and
separate cash flows and cash requirements. All of these
agencies require funds to be available upon demand. The
[Orange] County Pool's investment portfolio therefore
consists largely of short term securities.2 5
2
'
0 September Official Statement, supra note 138, at 16-18.
2 0Id. at cover page.211
'd. The firm was Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue of Irvine, California.
2 12
1d
"
2'"September Official Statement, supra note 138, at 19.
2 141d
21"'d.
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However, unlike the July Statement, the September Statement did
not mention marketability, volatility, or the amount of investments in
derivatives. In the July offering, the balance of the Investment Pool as
of June 16, 1994, was stated to be $7.71 billion based on original cost.!16
There was no comparable statement in the September Statement. In a
section entitled "Investment Performance," the September Statement put
the net yield on invested funds for the FY 1993-94 at 7.67%.17 It did
not refer to previous years performances, as did the July Statement. The
section on "Risk Factors" was silent as to the Investment Pool and the
possibility of losses on investments.
Looking at these two official statements, one has to ask who wrote
them, and perhaps more importantly, who read them? These
discrepancies point to a conclusion that Orange County sought to brighten
its disclosure document in the September offering by deleting negative
information.
As further evidence of this, one need only compare the descriptions
contained in the statements about Orange County. The description of the
issuer is standard fare for public offerings by state and local governments.
Typically, included in this part are statements about the size and wealth
of the issuer, major industries and employers, and trends with respect to
revenue sources of the County. With a frequent issuer, this section is
usually boilerplate language, updated to reflect current information.
Therefore, one would not expect to see many differences between an
official statement issued in July 1994 and one issued in September 1994.
However, there are significant differences between these
statements. Appendix A is a chart which compares the provisions of the
July Statement concerning the general description of Orange County, with
those of the September Statement. As can be seen in this comparison,
the significant changes made in the September Statement were uniform
in that the later official statement consistently deleted information, rather
than adding new information. Information which was negative was
minimized or eliminated.
PART THREE - ANALYSIS
A. Disclosure Incentives
The scheme for the existing system of regulations of the municipal
securities market is to provide a mechanism to force municipal issuers to
"
6July Official Statement, supra note 184, at 9.
"'September Official Statement, supra note 138, at 20.
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disclose information by tying issuer disclosure to access to the market for
public offerings. Relying to a great extent on the theory that once
information is public, the security prices will accurately reflect such
information, Rule 15c2-12, in particular, places more emphasis on giving
the information to the underwriters and on decentralized filings then on
getting information into the hands of the public investors or to the
regulatory authorities."'
There is no mechanism, other than the threat of litigation either by
the SEC or private parties for violations of Rule 1 Ob-5, to ensure that the
disclosure in official statements is adequate or timely. The lack of
litigation mechanisms may be interpreted as a sign that disclosure
regulation for the primary market is not needed in the sense that
nondisclosure does not result in investor losses. Given the trends in the
municipal securities market, particularly with respect to the nature of the
investor and the complexity of the securities, it is difficult to believe
investors in the municipal securities market are, as a group, in less need
of the disclosure protection than investors in the corporate market.
Seventy-six percent of the municipal securities are held by individuals
either as individual investors or through mutual and money market
funds.219
Moreover, as I have written elsewhere, there are important
efficiency reasons to require disclosure in the primary market.22 Studies
of organizations, generally, and governments, specifically, suggest that
negative economic information will not be disclosed willingly; if negative
economic information is disclosed at all, the disclosure will not be
timely.22' In Orange County, approximately 800 holders of obligations
were not paid on time. 2 The County's operating budget was slashed
41% 223 Approximately 1600 County employees lost their jobs, half from
224the County's social services agencies. Under a new plan worked out
with the State, $15 million will be set aside over approximately twenty
years to pay off the County's creditors. These are funds that would
otherwise go to public transportation, and other public services.225
21'See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
"'Levitt, supra note 135, at 7. Mutual funds hold 15% of outstanding municipal
securities. PUBLIC SECURITIEs ASSOCIATION, DEBT MARKET REPORT (annual report for 1994).
'"See Gellis, supra note 9, at 21-25.
...Id. at 44-56.
"'Utley, Creditors Approve One-Year Rollover, supra note 179, at 7.
"'.Leslie Wayne, Orange County FinancialPlan is Devised, N.Y.TIMEs, July 19, 1995,
at AI0.
"..Sterngold, supra note 135, at D8.
..'Michael Utley, County, Merrill to Argue Lawsuit's Merit in Court Today, TH-. BOND
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Despite the gains made in the last twenty years in disclosure
practices, there is still a problem of inadequate disclosure in the
municipal securities industry. The Orange County bankruptcy shows the
limitations of the current system in fostering disclosure in the primary
and secondary markets.
1. Disclosure By Issuers
Mr. Citron had fought a successful re-election campaign in June,
1994, with Merrill Lynch's financial support. One of the major issues in
the election was the incumbent's high risk investment policies and the
pitfalls of such policies. 6 As a result of charges made by Citron's
opponent published in a Wall Street Journal article in May 1994, SEC
officials from the Los Angeles office had separate meetings with the
challenger Mr. Moorlach and with Mr. Citron and his staff. Nothing
came of the meetings. In later testimony before a House Banking
Subcommittee looking into municipal securities disclosure in July 1995,
Paul Maco, director of the SEC's Office of Municipal Securities, testified
that there had been no indication of fraud, and therefore, nothing the SEC
could or should have done at the time."
The degree of riskiness in a local government's investment fund
was a matter for the state government to consider, not the SEC. If,
however, there had been prior staff review of the County's official
statements subsequent to May 1994, it is likely that the lack of disclosure
concerning the investment policies and existing losses would have been
noticed. At the same congressional hearing, representatives of the two
major ratings agencies, Standard & Poors and Moody's, were asked to
explain the high ratings given Orange County securities. They testified
that they had also relied on information supplied by the County, or more
specifically, Mr. Citron."
The reluctance or failure to look further, to ask for more
information, or to ask hard questions is part of a culture of nondisclosure
in the municipal securities market. It highlights the structural weakness
of the current system of regulation. Since the Tower Amendment
prohibits review of disclosure documents prior to the issuance of
BuYER, Dec. 1, 1995, at 48.
'Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Derivatives Roil California Political Race, WVALL ST. J.,
Apr. 15, 1994, at C1.
'The Municipal Securities Markets: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 26, 1995), 1995 WL 441680 (SEC), at *5-7
(1995).
sWayne, supra note 139, at D4.
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securities, there is no regulatory means to take proscriptive action. The
expost remedy of civil actions based on the antifraud provisions of Rule
lOb-5 is inadequate.
There is little reason to believe that the number of suits litigated
against issuers by either the SEC or by investors will be of sufficient
number to impress upon issuers the consequences of nondisclosure.
Neither the New York City nor the WPPSS investigations resulted in
actions for fraud against the issuers by the SEC, despite lengthy reports
which would have supported an action. Bondholders did sue. In the case
of New York, the court held that section 10(b)-5 did not cover
municipalities.229 In the WPPSS litigation, there were settlements
aggregating nearly $700 million.2"' Settling defendants were mainly
underwriters."' There were no Rule lOb-5 actions brought by the SEC
against municipalities as issuers in the years 1989-1994.232 Finally, the
SEC's investigation of the Orange County fiasco was settled without any
monetary fines.233
22'1n re New York City Mun. See. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),23
°Robert W. Collin, What the Law Says About Orange County: Creditors'Rights and
Remedies on Municipal Default, 16 MtrN. FIN. J. 52, 57 (Summer 1995).
2311d.
232See 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, app. D, at 1-16 for SEC cases involving
municipal securities in the 10-year period 1983-1993; see also 1990-1994 SEC. ANN. REP.
(discussing major litigation involving the SEC). Most of the SEC enforcement actions arc, as
would be expected, against brokers and dealers. Even there, for the 10 year period (1983-
1993), municipal securities cases related to disclosure were comparatively few. A BondBuyer
survey of court documents finds only three cases brought by the SEC against municipal issuers
for misleading disclosures. Lynn Stevens Hume, Denver's Position on Securities Fraud Law
Shocks Some Market Observers, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 13, 1995, at 1, 7.
In addition to Orange County, the SEC is currently considering actions based on
violations of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act against Nevada County, California
(involving a defaulted issue of non-rated bonds). Michael Utley, California County Argues
Against SEC Fraud Charges, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 7, 1995, at 1, 3. It is also investigating
Denver's disclosures on bonds issued to finance its new airport. Lynn Stevens Hume, SEC
Faces Mounting Debate Over its Enforcement Cases, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 18, 1995, at 1,
32. The response of issuers to these investigations is telling in that, despite 20 years of
regulation, issuers are amazed to find out they are subject to Rule I Ob-5. The city of Denver
is, in fact, asserting that municipal issuers are not subject to Rule lob-5. It seems clear,
however, that, unless regulation of the municipal securities market is a violation of the Tenth
Amendment, Denver's position is incorrect.
233The defendants, Orange County Flood Control District and Orange County Board
of Supervisors and its officers, settled without admitting or denying the allegations, whereby
the SEC got a civil injunction and a cease and desist order. SEC Enforcement: SEC
Announces Actions Relating to Orange County Investigations, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
4, at 103 (Jan. 26, 1996).
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But, even if the SEC were to vigorously enforce the antifraud
provisions, as it has begun to do, municipal defaults and crises have an
impact far wider than the creditors' pocketbooks. New York, WPPSS,
and Orange County crises each resulted in market-wide dislocations. 4
In the cases of New York and Orange County, as general function local
governments with a range of public services relied on by the public, their
financial woes extended to its citizens and to employees. A Rule 1Ob-5
suit cannot correct these municipal securities market disasters.
2. Disclosure by Financial Professionals
What can be said of the performance by underwriters, financial
advisors, underwriters' counsel, and bond counsel involved in the Orange
County offerings? These people worked on the County's official
statements on more than one transaction. At a state hearing, a
representative of the bond counsel for Orange County admitted that she
knew in October that the Investment Pool had suffered substantial losses.
Asked why those losses had not been disclosed, as would now be
required under the amended Rule 15c2-12, she responded that "disclosure
wasn't her responsibility."" 5 Unfortunately, this has been a long held
belief of bond counsel, a part of the culture of nondisclosure.
The role of bond counsel was sharply criticized in both the Staff
Report on the Transactions in the Securities of the City of New York and
in the Staff Report on the Transactions in the Securities of WPPSS. 3 6
In each case, bond counsel failed to investigate and make material
disclosures concerning negative information. Even today, the National
Association of Bond Lawyers is one of a very few industry groups who
have not endorsed the principle of periodic disclosurepI and have come
2'4See Gellis, supra note 9, at 29, for a discussion of the market effects in connection
with the two earlier crises. Nearly 10 years later, WPPSS bonds still show a negative price
effect, trading cheaper than other comparable double AA-rated bonds. Jon Birger, JVPPSS
Bonds May be a Bargain But Their '80s Stigma Still Lingers, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 7,1995,
at 1, 8.
sMichael Utley, Officials Say Many Saw Crisis Coming But None Spoke Out, THE
BOND BUYER, Feb. 21, 1995, at 1, 9.
"'
6NEw YORK SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 81; WPPSS SEC REPORT, supra note 2,
at 26.
3 See, e.g., Lynn Stevens Hume, NABL 's Next Chief Is "Glad" G-37 Decision is
Appealed, THE BOND BUYER, Sept. 20, 1995, at 1, 27. In questioning the need for MSRB Rule
G-37 with respect to financial consultants, the now head of the organization is quoted as
saying, "[Tihe information is out there if people want to find it." Id. This article also points
out that most NABL members have not adopted a policy of disclosure ofpolitical contributions
by law firms. ld.
1996]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 21
under criticism for its general attitude of nondisclosure. At present, the
group is resisting efforts of some bar associations to require disclosure of
consultants used by lawyers and to restrict campaign contributions.
Insofar as the underwriters are concerned, it seems clear that
despite two lengthy SEC interpretive releases focusing on underwriters'
responsibilities,238 underwriters' due diligence has not taken hold. There
is little incentive for the underwriters to do much more than a cursory
review. The default rate for municipal securities traditionally has been
low, and there is limited trading.239 These factors taken together have
made for a system characterized by little litigation. Thus, for the
underwriter, the risk of being sued is less than any benefits to be derived
from less due diligence and from pleasing its client, the issuer.24
There is also the problem of musical chairs with respect to a
frequent issuer. Bond counsel and underwriters' counsel often exchange
roles from one offering to the next. The same is true of underwriters and
financial advisors, as demonstrated by Orange County's offerings.24'
Although this is neither corrupt nor illegal, it does accentuate the cozy
relationships of the parties, which decreases the likelihood that a thorough
investigation will be made.242
"'Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,100, 53 Fed. Reg.
37,778, 37,787-37,791 (Sept. 28, 1988); Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure
Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33,741, 59
Fed. Reg. 12,748 (Mar. 17, 1994).
""Much is often made of the low default rate for municipal bonds as compared with-
corporate bonds. In the period 1983-1988, the rate of default on municipal bonds was 0.7%,
while the default rate for corporate debt was only slightly higher than 1.1%. Joel Seligman,
The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A ContextualApproach to the Evolving Structure of Federal
Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. PEv. 649, 699 (1995). More recent figures see both rates
increase, with a larger increase for corporate bonds. See infra note 261.
24°See Merritt B. Fox, Shef 1Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due
Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REv. 1005, 1029 (1984) (discussing that shelf
registration will ultimately result in less due diligence).
'Each of the two official statements examined disclosed multiple roles for Orange
County's advisors and counsel. In the July Statement, for example, counsel to the financial
consultant, Leifer Capital, Inc., was Brown & Wood, who, in turn, is one of Merrill Lynch's
outside counsel. Merrill Lynch was the investment bank through whom Orange County did
much of its investment. The September Statement discloses that bond counsel had represented
the underwriters on matters unrelated to the bonds and that counsel to the underwriter had
represented the County and the Orange County Employees Retirement System on matters
unrelated to the bonds. Compare July Official Statement, supra note 184 with September
Official Statement, supra note 138.
.
42Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1995), 1995 WL 361825, at 8-13 (SEC) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Jr.,
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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Trying to achieve a more effective system for municipal disclosure
requires repeal of the Tower Amendment. As long as the Tower
Amendment remains the law, one is confined to a system that is, by and
large, procedural, with little concern ex ante for content. Even with these
confines, however, there are problems with the current system of
regulation which limit its effectiveness.
B. Too Many Cooks
In comparing the municipal securities market to that of the
corporate market, the most noticeable and significant aspect of the
municipal securities market is that of numbers: there are 50,000
municipal issuers, with $1.2 trillion aggregate principal in securities
outstanding.243 An average of 8,000 municipal issuers go to market each
year.244
Any observation of American politics at the local level points out
the large number of local governments with either praise of the
decentralized, community controlled political system, or with criticism of
the inefficiency and balkanization resulting from local government
control. In fact, the sheer size of the number of potential issuers is
usually the first reason given (other than the Tower Amendment) for not
adopting the system of securities regulation that exists for corporate
issuers.
The system of regulation that is now in place shares this basic
characteristic of too many players and too many regulators. Unlike the
corporate securities market, which has one federal regulatory agency, the
SEC, the municipal securities market has two, the MSRB and the SEC.
As an entity, the MSRB is more like the SEC than it is like the other
SROs. The staff of the MSRB often make pronouncements as to actions
it or the SEC will take. The two regulate on the same concerns, with the
baton of leadership on any particular issue switching back and forth
between the two.245
2431993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
24Levitt, supra note 135, at 7 n3.
245For example, regulation of periodic disclosure originally was to be under the
MSRB's umbrella, but problems with the Tower Amendment caused the shift to the SEC. See
infra note 252. MSRB rules with regard to ratings disclosure, T-3 settlement, and price
transparency were each initiated with the prodding of the SEC. In an SEC release issued on
November 17, 1994, addressing ratings disclosure, the release states that the "portion of Rule
15c2-13 that would require disclosure if a municipal security was not rated by an NRSRO
[nationally recognized statistical rating organization] has been deferred and will be withdrawn
if the MSRB act to adopt similar amendments to its confirmation rule, Rule G-15."
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Enforcement of MSRB rules is not by the MSRB but given to a
total of five different entities: the NASD, the SEC, and the three federal
regulators of banks.246 Since the number of banks acting as municipal
securities dealers has been declining in recent years, having three separate
regulators underscores the inefficiency of this enforcement mechanism.
The statutory make-up of the Board also reflects the much greater role
that banks played in the market at the time the MSRB was created in
1975.247 The bank's dealers have five members, issuers have a minimum
of one and a maximum of four.24
There is also the ineffectiveness of the filing requirements. Where
disclosure documents are filed depends on what kind of document is
being filed. Under Rule 15c2-12, official statements may be filed with
a NRMSIR (not necessarily all), and a copy must accompany the
confirmation of a sale to a customer who requests one.249 The Rule itself
does not require a copy to be filed with the MSRB or the SEC. Under
MSRB Rule G-36, however, two copies of the official statement are to
be filed with the MSRB, 250 one of which is then filed in the Municipal
Securities Information Library, a central file available for public use.
Annual financial information required by paragraph (b)(5) of Rule I 5c2-
12, on the other hand, is to be filed with each NRMSIR and any relevant
SID; whereas the material event statements can be filed either with each
NRMSIR or the MSRB and any SID.23'
It is hard to understand why a number of filings are required for
some secondary market disclosures, but not for others. The omission of
any filing requirements with the SEC may be for the purpose of
minimizing the argument that the Rule violates the Tower Amendment,
even though no filings are subject to prior' review.2 2  Added to this
Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,962, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,612, at
59,613 (Nov. 17, 1994). The MSRB did amend its rule. Similarly, changes in the MSRB's
suitability rules (Rule G-19) were enicted at the specific suggestion of the SEC set forth in a
letter from the Director of the Division of Market Regulation. Letter from William H. Heyman
to Christopher Taylor, Executive Director (May 8, 1992).2 6See 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 17, 53-54, in which the staff discusses
the split of enforcement. It expresses support of the existing structure but laments the lack of
cooperation and coordination among the regulators. Id.
2715 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (1994).2481d.
"917 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(4) (1995).21OMSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3676 (Rule G-36(b)(i)).
25117 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(A), (C) (1995).
252By its terms, § 15B of the 1934 Act prohibits the SEC from requiring issuers to
make prior filings. The MSRB, on the other hand, is prohibited from requiring issuers to file
any documents or information with the MSRB or to provide any document or information to
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layered structure is the fact that there is little direction, particularly with
respect to the continuing disclosure rules, as to what is to be filed, other
than the basic rule that whatever was filed in the official statement must
be updated and continued. 3 Even accepting the fact that the electronic
age makes filing in a number of places much easier, and that information
is more easily stored and accessed, this system is overly convoluted.
C. Enforcement; Effectiveness
In the end, we have a securities market with many issuers and
issues, where issuers are required to produce information unspecified as
to content or form, and to disseminate this information to a sizeable
number of different entities depending on the nature of the filing. But,
no filing of an official statement, annual report, or material events
statement, all required by Rule 15c2-12, is made with the SEC. This
ought to make SEC oversight difficult. Similarly, underwriters, with
whom the issuers contract under amended Rule 15c2-12, have no duty
beyond the investigations necessary under the MSRB suitability rules to
see that issuers live up to their contractual promises.
Rule 15c2-12 is not completely without teeth. Dealers are required
to put in place procedures for obtaining current information and notices
of material events so their recommendations will be made with complete
disclosure. 4 Issuers are to notify each NRMSIR or the MSRB of any
failure of an obligated person to provide annual financial information as
required by its agreements. 5  The Rule also requires the official
statement of an issuer to contain a statement of any failures within the
prior five years by it or by other obligated persons to abide by their
agreements related to other offerings. 2 6
a purchaser. The SEC is specifically not subject to this much broader prohibition. 17 C.F.R.
§ 15B(d)(2) (1991).
"317 C.F.R.§ 15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(A);StatementoftheCommissionRegardingDisclosure
Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33,741, 59
Fed. Reg. 12,748 (Mar. 17, 1994). For example, if audited financials are used in the official
statement, all future financials must be audited. The proposed Rule 15c2-12(b)(5) would have
required municipal issuers to use audited financials. This %as removed in the face of much
criticism to the effect that municipal issuers are too diverse; for some, using audited financials
would be a prohibitive cost. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No.
34,961, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,456, at 85,954-85,958
(Nov. 10, 1994).
2517 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(c) (1995).
5'17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(D) (1995).
-6 17 C.F.R. § 240.15e2-12(f)(3) (1995).
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Most recently, the SEC has announced that it does not intend to
increase its own enforcement of Rule 15c2-12. The SEC sees the Rule
as a procedural rule to be enforced primarily by the NASD. Yet, the
SEC's recent condemnation of the NASD for failure to police the
municipal securities market and enforce Rule G-37 is evidence of the
inefficiency of this approach to enforcement." 7 Ultimately, Rule 15c2-12
relies on market forces to bring compliance. The difficulty is that
markets can only do so much to control government behavior. One need
only to look at the fate of Orange County's proposed increase in the sales
tax for evidence of this fact. One would expect Orange County citizens
to prefer the County to externalize the costs of their financial mistakes to
the County's creditors rather than levy a tax to pay their debts. That is
exactly what they chose to do. Recent news articles point out that the
poor and disadvantaged are bearing the brunt of the County's budget cuts.
The middle class and wealthy have been largely untouched.25
There are few cases in this area because in the past municipal
issuers rarely defaulted or filed for bankruptcy protection.259 The "full
faith and credit" guaranty of general obligation bonds has depended
largely on the issuer's good faith, and the long memory of the market.
However, full faith and credit means less today, given the enactment of
property tax limits that restrict raising funds even to pay the
government's debt obligations. Orange County is the first, although
probably not the last large government issuer, to use Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Act to avoid its debt obligations. The rare default and the
code of ethics not to default on guaranteed debt were a part of a time of
prosperity which no longer exists.
Defaults under "conduit" bonds, bonds where the municipal issuer
is not the economic borrower, are the most common. Such bonds are
issued to give the economic borrower the benefit of the issuer's federal
interest tax exemption. Payments on the bonds are either from revenues
of the conduit or from project revenues.26 Similarly, defaults are higher
2
"Hume, SEC Slams NASD, supra note 114, at 7; Michael Stanton, Maco Says SEC
Doesn't Plan Special 15c2-12 Enforcement, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 14, 1995, at 1.
258Sterngold, supra note 135, at D8.
"'The City of Bridgeport, Connecticut, filed for bankruptcy in 1991; but with the
State's opposition and a new election, the proceedings were truncated. The State objected to
the filing on a number of grounds. The bankruptcy court agreed with the State that on the date
of filing, Bridgeport was neither insolvent nor on the brink of insolvency. There was no appeal
because of a change in city administration. James Spiotto, Municipal Insolvency: Bankruptcy,
Receivership Workouts and Alternative Remedies in 3 M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING, ch. 13, § 13.38 (1994).
26"See 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (defining revenue bonds and
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for unrated, uninsured bonds.2"' The SEC has proposed legislation to
Congress making conduit financing subject to the same registration
requirements as corporate securities. 62 Should this ever come to pass,
disclosure problems with those securities would be addressed. The
MSRB, at the SEC's urging, has amended its rules to require customer's
confirmation statements to disclose when a bond is unrated26 3
As far as the small, unrated issues are concerned, Rule 15c2-12
does not apply to offerings of less than $1 million.2 Thus, the new
changes will not affect disclosure for these offerings. Issuers with
outstanding securities (including the present offering and any other
securities of the issuer previously exempted because of the small size of
the issue) which do not aggregate to more than $10 million are exempt
from the requirements related to filing annual financial information, but
not from the requirement of filing notices of "material events." 6 ' As a
consequence, the types of issuers more likely to default are probably
under no duty to provide information; and while there is an obligation on
small issuers to give notice of "material events," there is no mechanism
to insure compliance by these small issuers.
Defaults in the municipal securities market fall at the two ends of
a continuum. At one end are the small bond issues as discussed above.
At the other end are the large defaults that shake the market and have
widespread effects on the local economy. Orange County was in the
second group. Evidence, both in terms of the disclosure inadequacies in
its official statements and in terms of timeliness, reminds us that
conduit bonds).
261In the 1993 SEC Staff Report, the staff cites to a report by one of the leading
municipal bond financial institutions, Municipal Bond Defaults - Thte 80's: A Decade in
Review (2) (JJ. Kenny Co. 1993), which found that "the incidence of default among all the
bonds in the study appeared to be inversely related to the 'essentiality' of the bond-finance
projects." 1993 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, app. B, at 3. The problem of defaults by
small issuers and small issues in general regarding the application of the securities laws is not
unique to the municipal securities market but has parallels in the corporate market. See, eg..
Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,962, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,612
(Nov. 17, 1994) (requiring disclosure of non-rated corporate bonds in confirmations); see
generally J. WILLAM HiCKs, LwIFmD OFFEIUNG ExEMPTIONS: REGULATION D, § 1.03 (1995-
96) (providing an overview of the rules governing small issues); 3 LouIs Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURriES REGULATION 1307-19 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing the efforts of Congress
and the SEC to find the right level of regulation of small issue offerings which protects the
investor with respect to higher risk securities and which is not prohibitively costly).
2
"See Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,962,59 Fed. Reg.
59,612 (Nov. 17, 1994).
63See MSRB MANUAL, supra note 19, 3571 (Rule G-15(a)(i)(C)(3)(f)).
2617 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a) (1995).
26517 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(d)(2), (d)(2)(ii)(B) (1995).
1996]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
politicians will cover up negative economic news for as long as they
can.266 If Orange County's disclosure is any measure of underwriters due
diligence or rating agencies' information, these groups are not providing
the necessary monitoring functions.
The issue of timeliness of disclosure has been recognized by most
observers and participants in the municipal securities market as a
continuing problem, even with disclosure in primary offerings.167 Given
the decentralized system for disseminating information and the lack of
parallelism between the rulemaker and rule enforcer, it does not seem
likely that the new requirements will lessen the problem of timeliness.
D. Consequences of Rule G-37
There is no way of documenting whether the marketplace is more
corrupt today than in the past, although observers of the market seem to
believe that the "pay-to-play" practices have become more prevalent.268
It may well be, however, that rather than the market being more corrupt
and inequitable, the increased federal regulation of market disclosure has
caused old "pay-to-play" practices to stand out more sharply and be more
at odds with the underlying premise of federal securities laws to provide
for a fair and open market. There may seem to be more instances of
kickbacks, bribes, etc., simply because the SEC and the MSRB have
focused their attention on the subject.
In fact, the first stirrings to do something about corruption came
from the dealers themselves through the MSRB. Without diminishing the
benefits of a rule like Rule G-37, the rule is, of course, self-serving for
dealers. Now, dealers do not have to spend money to contribute to public
officials' campaigns, knowing that all dealers are so prohibited.
Finally, the existence of more corruption may also be a result of
an increase in complex financings. The difference in the level of
2
"See Gellis, supra note 9, at 44-65, for an analysis of incentives and motivations of
politicians and bureaucrats not to disclose negative economic information. Empirical evidence
from New York City, WPPSS, and Orange County documents the theoretical analysis of
bureaucratic behavior.
1671d. at 67-68. See also Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure
Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33,741, 59
Fed. Reg. 12,748 (Mar. 17, 1994) (discussing problems with compliance and the need for
reform regarding disclosure in the municipal securities market). Standard & Poors has recently
indicated that it will pull the bond ratings of issuers who fail to provide annual financial
information as required under Rule 15c2-12(b)(5)(i). Lynn Stevens Hume, S&P May Pull
Bond Ratings if Disclosure Rules Not Met, THE BOND BUYER, Nov. 28, 1995, at 1, 4.
6 Hume, Pay-to-Play, supra note 125, at 3.
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sophistication and variety of securities now used in the municipal
securities market as compared to the financings of just fifteen years ago
is vast. Municipal issuers now issue securities that go beyond the bread
and butter general obligation and revenue bonds of the past. They market
derivative securities, variable rate securities, collateralized securities, and
even taxable securities. Given the resource limitations of state and local
governments, coupled with a continuing need to borrow, issuers are more
dependent on outside financial advisors than ever before, both formal and
informal.
Will the new Rule G-37 help eliminate corruption? The history of
"good government" reforms at the local level, such as competitive
bidding, has been of mixed results. For example, the growth of quasi-
municipal entities in the post World War II era to provide public services
was, in part, motivated by a desire to avoid the earlier "good
government" reforms, such as civil service and competitive bidding in the
purchase of goods and services, which reforms were later perceived as
bureaucratic red tape. In a similar fashion, commentators now point to
the myriad of special districts and authorities as adding to the
balkanization of local government and a lack of accountability to the
citizenry.
The fact that the "pay-to-play" custom has dominated the process
of underwriting municipal securities is not very surprising. Politics and
corruption are natural handmaidens. In fact, the traditional state laws
requiring municipal issuers to use competitive bidding were enacted
precisely to prevent corruption and favoritism in the award of
underwriting contracts.269
The adoption of Rule G-37, which is applicable only to negotiated
underwritings, should result in more competitive bid offerings. This was
no doubt one of the intended results of Rule G-37. The chairman of the
SEC has spoken in favor of greater use of competitive bidding because
it is less costly, and there is less opportunity for influence peddling."
269See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., State Laws Regarding Issuance of Bonds and Notes in 3
GELFAND, supra note 259, ch. 11, § 11:27; see also City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So. 2d 916
(Fla. 1953) (holding that a contract binding the city to sell its bonds to its agent, advisor, and
employee is contrary to public policy and the proposal by the same agent, advisor, and
employee to buy such bonds and the acceptance by the city commission to deal were also
contrary to public policy). The Florida Supreme Court held that a negotiated underwriting
agreement with First Boston was void as against public policy, even though the applicable state
statute permitted negotiated sales, because the underwiter has an inherent conflict of interest
as agent of the issuer and purchaser of the bonds. Id. at 920-21.
2"01993 Congressional Hearings, supra note 60, at 6, 210 (testimony ofArthur Levitt,
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Thus far, the numbers do not show any sustained, significant increase in
its use."'
The advantages and disadvantages of both competitive bidding and
negotiated underwritings are one of the few areas of the municipal
securities market which have been studied by finance scholars. Various
studies show that, if bringing securities successfully to market at the
lowest costs to the issuer is the goal, then a municipal securities issuer
must be able to use both forms of underwriting.272 For plain vanilla
general obligation bonds and revenue bond financings, competitive
bidding is usually cheaper.27a However, as a financing grows in dollar
volume and complexity, it becomes more cost efficient to use a
negotiated underwriting.274 Another factor which is critical to the
decision of which form to use is the potential number of bidders.
Evidence consistently shows that the fewer the bidders, the more likely
no cost savings will be obtained from using competitive bidding.2"
New Jersey law provides a good example of a state's predicament
in trying to eliminate opportunities for influence peddling and kickbacks
by eliminating negotiated offerings. One of the SEC's first widely
publicized enforcement actions related to political corruption involved a
New Jersey issuer's negotiated offering. Political officials and other
businesses received various undisclosed payments for helping to secure
the issuer's business. In response to the investigation, Governor Thomas
Florio issued an order prohibiting negotiated offerings except under
"extraordinary circumstances" and only if approved by the state
treasurer.276 The effect was to stall large and complex municipal
securities offerings.277 Two years later, in 1994, Governor Christine Todd
Whitman revised the order to allow negotiated offerings where the
complexity or size makes a negotiated offering more suitable.278 The
"7'In 1994, 30.1% (49.5 billion of 164.5 billion) of new issues were competitively bid.
At year end in 1995, the percent was 26% ($41.1 billion of $158.86). PUBLIC SECURITIES
ASSOCIATION, DEBT MARKET REPORT (annual report for 1994).
27"See generally Paul A. Leonard, Negotiated Versus Competitive Bond Sales: A
Review of the Literature, 15 MuN. FIN. J. 12 (Summer 1994) (providing a compilation and
evaluation of the finance studies of the two underwriting processes).
27'Id. at 14.
2741d. at 16.
271d. at 32.
..
6Charles Gasparino, New Jersey Considering Expanding When to Use Negotiated
Bond Sales, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 5, 1994, at 1.
'Joyce Hanson, New Jersey Gov. 's Order May Affect Transportation Issues, THE
BOND BUYER, Mar. 15, 1995, at 1, 28.
2"Joyce Hanson, New Jersey Agencies Prepare for More Negotiated Sales Due to
Executive Order, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 29, 1994, at 2.
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revision also dropped the requirement of obtaining the state treasurer's
approval. 2
79
Even more interesting than the SEC and MSRB's recognition of
corruption is the question of what motivates the federal regulators to
regulate local campaign contributions when the practices do not directly
affect the interests of the investors in municipal securities? Chairman
Levitt has suggested that pay-to-play practices make dealers less vigilant
in their investigative duties.2 0  However, the connection between
campaign contributions and investor concerns has been questioned by at
least one court.2 '
As discussed above, incentives for underwriters to perform due
diligence are weak in the municipal securities market, even in connection
with negotiated offerings where lack of time is not an acceptable excuse.
Moreover, one of the drawbacks in using competitive bidding offerings,
even where appropriate, is the smaller opportunity for underwriters to
perform due diligence. Thus, to some extent Rule G-37 may help to get
rid of corruption at the expense of disclosure.
Since Rule G-37 ought to result in more competitive bidding, there
will be an increase in the use of financial advisors, which also affects
disclosure. One unintended result of the original enactment of state
statutes requiring competitive bidding for municipal securities offerings
was the need for financial advisors. This function could not be provided
by the managing underwriter as is standard in negotiated underwritings,
because in competitively bid transactions, the underwriters are brought in
at the end of the financing process.282
The splitting of the functions of underwriter into two separate
providers, the financial advisor and the underwriter, has created a whole
industry of financial consultants for municipal securities issuers. Some
are investment bankers who also offer underwriting services (e.g., Merrill
Lynch, Lazard Freres). Others are part of a growing number of firms
specializing in financial advice only. The number of issues in which
financial advisors participated increased 95% in the period 1986 to
1992.283 Use of financial advisors has become so prevalent that it is not
2791d
u1993 Congressional Hearings, supra note 60, at 6,210 (testimony of Arthur Levitt,
Jr.).
"Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
2s2See Robert A. Fippinger & Edward L. Pittman, Disclosure Obligations of
Underwriters of Municipal Securities, 47 Bus. LAW. 127, 134 (1991).
28
'Craig L. Johnson, The Changing Market Structure of the Municipal Financial
Advisor Industry, 15 MuN. FiN. J. 1 (Spring 1994) (discussing the expanding role of financial
advisors). Evidence of the growvth of a separate segment of professionals can be seen in the
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unusual for an issuer to use a financial advisor in negotiated deals. The
financial advisor essentially negotiates with the managing underwriter as
to pricing, fees, etc. In 1992, financial advisors were used in 24% of the
negotiated issues, both general obligation and revenue bonds.2 4  It
appears that Orange County used a financial advisor in the two negotiated
offerings discussed in Part II above.
The split in roles results in a confusion as to who is responsible for
undertaking due diligence investigations and who may be liable as
between the two parties. Both have overlapping responsibilities for
disclosure. The advisor is an agent for the issuer, and typically controls
the drafting of the official statement. As such, the financial advisor may
have a primary responsibility for statements made in the official statement
as opposed to the due diligence test for underwriters. 2 5 At a minimum,
they have no less an investigatory duty than underwriters.286
The use of financial advisors also introduces another opportunity
for the use of other consultants, such as finders.2 7 Typically, the hiring
of financial advisors is not subject to competitive bidding requirements,
permitting public officials far more latitude in choosing an advisor and
allowing the opportunity for political pay-offs. Thus, a shift to
competitive bidding may be beneficial in terms of issuers' underwriting
costs, but it may not eliminate the problems of conflict of interest and
influence peddling. Nor does proposed Rule G-38, requiring disclosure
of all consultants and their contracts, eliminate this problem for
competitively bid offerings.
establishment in 1989 of a separate trade association for independent financial advisors). Id.
at 2.
"
41d. at 5. An earlier study of financial advisors looked specifically at the role of
advisors in negotiated offerings. Ronald W. Forbes et al., The Role of Financial Advisors in
the Negotiated Sale of Tax Exempt Securities, 8 J. OF APPLIED Bus. REs. 7 (1992). This earlier
study found that the major function of advisors in negotiated transactions was to "certify" the
underwriter's offering price with the result that the certification will lower the borrower's cost.
Id. at 9-10. The study found that the costs of adding a financial advisor were "only moderately
offset by corresponding benefits in the form of lower borrowing costs." Id. at 12. The authors
cite other possible reasons for the use of financial advisors in negotiated underwritings: (1) to
serve as a shield for the politician from the bond sale; (2) for "interpretative" services for a new
issuer; (3) given the limits of monitoring the activity of local governments, evidence of the
"opportunity for public officials to engage in more opportunistic behaviors." Id. at 12-13.
2
"See generally GELFAND, supra note 27, ch. 8A.
... Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,100, 53 Fed. Reg.
37,778, 37,778 (Sept. 28, 1988) (SEC Interpretation of Underwriters Investigatory
Responsibility); see supra text accompanying notes 282-83.
287See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text (discussing MSRB Rule G-38).
[Vol. 21
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKEr
CONCLUSION
Without repeal of the Tower Amendment, there are limitations on
what can be accomplished to make the system more effective. In an
earlier article, I advocated imposing registration requirements for public
offerings of municipal securities, and imposing a civil liability scheme
modeled after section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.288 Admittedly,
the prospects for enactment of registration requirements in an era of
deregulation are slim. But, the second half of the proposal might be
more palatable and, thus, of more practical utility. A statute that imposed
liability on underwriters, financial advisors, and counsel for false and
misleading statements contained in an official statement would, unlike the
threat of liability under Rule l0b-5, impress upon these professional
participants the importance of their due diligence obligations. Unless the
professionals can demonstrate that they made a reasonable investigation,
and after such investigation they had reasonable grounds to and did
believe the statements to be true and not misleading, they would be liable
for misleading or false statements. As is the case under section 11, the
standard of care for financial professionals would be negligence, not
intentional fraud or recklessness as is the case with Rule lOb-5 liability.
This standard should create an incentive, missing from the current
liability scheme, to pay closer attention to the content of disclosure
documents. Professionals found to have been negligent would be held
liable for the difference between the offering price and the value at the
time of the suit or at the price at which the security was sold.
Unlike my earlier proposal, this modified scheme would not make
issuers absolutely liable for misstatements in official statements. Rather,
like financial professionals, issuers would be liable for negligent
misrepresentations. The official statement is, of course, legally and
practically the issuer's document. A scheme in which issuers could only
be sued for intentional or reckless misrepresentations would be consistent
with the existing scheme that focuses on changing the behavior of
underwriters and counsel and would also allow for the continued
protection of the issuer under the Tower Amendment. But, given the past
experiences, it is doubtful that this (even with pressure from underwriters)
would be sufficient to change issuer disclosure behavior.
Structurally, a less ambitious reform, one that also requires
legislation, is to abolish the MSRB as a statutory entity. Since the SEC
is actively regulating in the area, there seems little reason for two
"2Gellis, supra note 10, at 108-21.
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government regulators. The MSRB would then be on a par with the
other SROs. It could decide its own make-up and could enforce its own
rules (once approved by the SEC). SEC policies which apply to both
markets (e.g., adoption of T+3 settlement; disclosure of unrated
securities) could be handled with one action or rule, rather than separate
lock-step rules, as is currently the case.
The effort to decentralize the dissemination of information should
be reconsidered both in terms of issuer costs to file annual financial
information and in terms of reducing the complexity of compliance. It
would make more sense to have a central filing with the MSRB or the
SEC and regional filings with one NRMSIR per region. As it is presently
constituted, there are a possible seven filings for each issuer's annual
financial information (six NRMSIRs + one SIDs). By simplifying the
system, issuers would be less dependent on outside advisors and
consultants and, hence, costs and opportunities for influence peddling
would be lessened as well.
There is a strong impulse on the part of municipal securities
market participants to make piece-meal changes in the regulation of the
market in response to a crisis, and then to ignore the market and its
operations until the next crisis. We are already entering this phase with
respect to the recent events. The SEC, after all of its focus on the
municipal securities market and the enactment of new regulation, has
indicated that enforcement of Rule 15c2-12 will be left in the hands of
the NASD. It announced that it does not plan to enforce its rule. It has
entered into settlement of its enforcement action against Orange County
and its officers, agreeing not to impose any monetary fines.289 The
message is clear: as long as an issuer complies with the procedures, or
is not caught by the NASD for noncompliance, no one is looking to the
substance of disclosure. In other words, it's "business as usual" until the
next Orange County, WPPSS, or New York City.
289SEC Enforcement, supra note 233, at 103.
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APPENDIX A
THE COUNTY OF ORANGE
COMPARISON OF SELECTED SECTIONS
OF THE JULY AND SEPTEMBER
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS
JULY 1994
POPULATION
Growth During Last Decade
* Table statistics from
1983 to 1993
* Presented a projected
growth table
SEPTEMBER 1994
* Table statistics from
1985 to 1994
INDUSTRY TRENDS & OUTLOOK
* Total nonagricultural
wage and salary employ-
ment (1,122,400)
decrease of 2.9% (base
of 1989)
* Greatest decline in jobs
was in manufacturing,
retail trade, and
construction
* Period of slow growth in
county has continued
longer than expected and
is anticipated to continue
through 1994
* Total nonagricultural
wage and salary employ-
ment (1,122,400)
decrease of 1.9% (base
of 1991)
* Growth for all non-agri-
cultural industries
except mining and
manufacturing
[No comparable statement
re: growth]
Construction
* 47,400 jobs in 1992,
down from 62,700 in
1989
* Projected employment
will not reach original
forecast of 81,700 by
1996; now forecast
* 47,400 jobs in 1992
* Expected to increase
10.8% to 52,500 by 1998
[No comparable statement]
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52,500 (10.8% increase)
by 1998
* Industry has been among
sectors hardest hit in
current recession
Manufacturing
* Jobs declined by 32,600
from 1989-1992
* Original forecast of
276,900 jobs by 1998
too' optimistic; now
expect decrease of
5,500 jobs in durable
goods and increase of
3,400 in nondurable
goods
Transportation & Public Utilities
* 1992 jobs average
35,300 an increase of
2.9% over 1989
* Figure should rise to
39,700 by 1996
0 Jobs declined by 25,600
from 1990-1992
* Total manufacturing
employment expected to
decline by 1% to 216,300
in 1998
* 1992 jobs average 35,300
0 Figure should reach
37,800 in 1998
Wholesale Trade
0 1992 average jobs was
78,800; forecast for
1996 was 106,000; now
revise down to 80,000
1992 average 78,800;
forecast for 1998 is
80,000
* Jobs declined by 17,700
(8%) from 1989-1992
* Original forecast for
1996 of 249,700 down-
sized to 214,400 by
1998
* Retail trade is third
largest industry in
county
* Employment expected to
advance by 13,200 (6.6%)
between 1992 and 1998
Retail Trade
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Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate Services
* Expect continued
growth through 1998,
although at slower rate
than previously estimated
0 Services averaged 318,300
jobs in 1992; estimated
to be 340,700 by 1998
Government
* 1992 showed increase 0
of 6,900 jobs from 1989
0 Budgetary constraints *
expected to slow growth;
project 120,600 jobs in
1998
112,100 jobs in 1992
expected to increase to
120,600 by 1998
Bulk of increase
expected in area of state
and local education
EDUCATION
Elementary & Secondary
• Table of public school
enrollment from 1989 to
1993
Table of public school
enrollment from 1988 to
1993
EMPLOYMENT
* Table comparing
Orange County, Califor-
nia, U.S. labor force,
employment and unem-
ployment; table of top 50
private sector employers
for 1993
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
* Table summarizing the i
annual volume of
taxable transactions
within county from
1989 through first half
of 1993
* No employment/unemploy-
ment table contained in
the prospectus
Table summarizing the
annual volume of
taxable transactions
within county from
1988 through 1992
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AGRICULTURE
0 Table of gross value of
farm production for
1987 through 1992
* Agriculture only 0.7%
of jobs in 1992
0 U.S. Census of Agri-
culture in 1987 ranked
county 68th of 3,141 in
total market value of
agricultural products
sold
* Table of gross value of
farm production for
1988 through 1993
* Agriculture only 0.7%
of jobs in 1993
* Does not discuss U.S.
Census; however, says
CA D.F.A. ranked county
20th of 58 in total
COUNTY WATER SUPPLY & CALIFORNIA DROUGHT
* County experienced 6 0 [Information not in
years of drought from prospectus]
1987 to 1992; water
year 1993-1994 declared
critically dry year;
heavy rainfall in January
1993 resulted in a pre-
liminary estimate of a
$40 million loss in the
county due to flood
damage
* The Metropolitan Water 0 [Information not in
District has instituted prospectus]
phased rate surcharge
program to reduce water
delivery by 20-50%;
several Orange County
cities have introduced
conservation measures;
difficult to predict
economic impact of
drought on county
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NATURAL DISASTERS; SEISMIC ACTIVITY/FIRES
0 General information;
October 26, 1993, series
of fires in Southern
California, burning over
an estimated 300 homes
and 18,700 acres of land
in Orange County
0 [Information not in
prospectus]
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